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THE INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
AN INTEGRATIVE REPORT* 
Meliza H. Agabin, Mario B. Lamberte, 
Mabar K. Mangahas and Ma. Alcestis A. Mangahas** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is part of a comparative study of informal credit 
markets (ICMs) in five Asian countries sponsored by the Asian 
Development Bank. The five countries — Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand — were selected to capture 
the diversity of ICMs in the region. 
The issues hoped to be covered in the country study are 
quite comprehensive and wide ranging. Divided into four major 
groups, the topics encompass the following: 
i) major structure of the ICMs, size and trends in size, 
and policy and legal environment; 
ii) role of ICMs in savings generation and provision of 
consumption credit, allocation efficiency, issues on 
equity, interaction of ICMs with the formal sectors, and 
implications for monetary policy and depositor security; 
*An integration of the major results of various studies 
conducted under the Asian Development Bank-sponsored regional 
research on informal credit markets. 
**The authors are Vice-President, Social Weather Stations, 
Inc. (SWS); Vice-President, Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS); President, SWS; and Secretary-Treasure*, SWS, 
respectively. 
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iii) interest rate formation in ICMs and trends, competition 
between formal and informal sectors, ICMs as a possible 
source of innovations, interlinkage of credit with 
transactions in other markets, and promoting links with 
the informal sector; and 
iv) an optimal legal and policy environment towards the 
informal sector. 
The country study for the Philippines is a collaborative 
effort among various researchers. Five (5) study modules have 
been identified. The modules listed below focus on particular 
aspects and issues in the ICMs which are most relevant to 
existing financial and economic environment of the country and 
need for policy formulation. 
Module 1 - a review of policies impinging on the informal 
credit markets in the country which highlights 
the contractionary and expansionary episodes in 
the formal credit system during the period- -1970-
1986, and the responses of the formal and 
informal credit markets; 
Module 2 - the informal credit markets in urban Metro 
Mainila, which probes into credit cooperatives, 
trade credits* rotating savings and credit 
associations (£OSCAs), and individual; money-
lenders; 
Module 3 - the, credit history of farming and non*-farming 
households and history of lending by ICM lenders 
in six (6) rural villages; 
. r • I. • •. . : 1 ' ; ; 
Module 4 - the ICMs in relation to the overseas employment 
sector, which examines the case of financing the 
oyer^a^s contract • workers and the role of; the 
informal lenders; and 
Module 5 - monitoring the market conditions within the ICM, 
which discusses the needs and methodologies for 
institutionalizing a monitoring system. 
. ,;„ From the modules,, it would appear that the«re is unequal 
treatment of the urban and £pral ICMs. . There are reasons for 
this. Studies on rural ICMs in the Philippines, are quite 
abundant (see for example Table 6, this report). In fact, the 
most recent ones af e included -if) this report. However, previous 
stptfies. pn jrurali iCMs* jUse^  cross^sectijon dfifea. Thus, .Module 3 is 
quite uni&j^a. since"i,t,examines the credit history • of ruxjal 
villages. In contrast, there are very few studies on urhain- ICHs> 
hence the need to have more studies in this area. 
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There are other considerations. One is the need to focus on 
major economic activities or sectors that largely depend on ICMs 
for external finance. A case in point is the overseas employment 
sector which owes much of its continued vigor to the support of 
the ICMs. In 1987 alone, the estimated size of the credit market 
for overseas workers was £1.75 billion, of which 98 percent came 
from informal source (Mangahas 1989). The other is the need to 
study institutions in the borderline, e.g., pawnshops, money-
shops, lending investors (Lis), and non-stock savings and loan 
associations (NSSLAs). 
Nine (9) working papers have been completed for this study. 
They appear in Annex A, which also describes the respondents and 
the research instruments used in gathering information for the 
various papers. Since the methodological details are contained 
in the separate reports, data sourcing will be described here 
only briefly. 
To study the urban ICM, the researchers undertook surveys 
and case studies of major informal lending arrangements in urban 
Metro Manila. They focused on trade credits in the footwear 
industry of Marikina; the cooperative credit unions in offices 
and public markets; and "paluwagan" units (the Philippine version 
of a ROSCA) and professional moneylenders in the low-income 
community of Sapang Palay, a resettlement area in the fringe of 
Metro Manila. 
The micro-level history of rural ICM from 1972 to 1987 was 
analyzed with the survey data obtained in 1987 from some 162 
rural households and 46 informal lenders in four rice-based and 
two rice-onion-based villages in the municipalities of Cabiao 
and Laur, respectively. Both towns are located in the province 
of Nueva Ecija in Central Lu?on region. 
Some 336 overseas contract workers (OCWs) and 12 lenders to 
overseas workers were interviewed in 1987. Of the OCWs, 153 are 
getting their overseas job for the first time; 183 respondents 
are "rehired," that is, either covered by contract renewal or 
getting another job placement abroad. In-depth interviews of 
selected lenders were conducted in view of the peculiarities of 
some financing arrangements in the sending of contract workers 
abroad. . 
Twenty seven (27) case studies of a mix of informal credit 
suppliers operating in either the rural or urban areas, or both, 
were done toward the design of a monitoring system on the ICM. 
The information regarding the institutional aspects of the 
credit markets were obtained through interviews with officers of 
selected commercial banks, rural banks, money shops, and the 
Central Bank (CB). A report on the pawnshops was also prepared 
based on the 1980 to 1986 financial statements of I N sample 
pawnshops drawn randomly from a total of 1,143 pawnshops 
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operating as of 1986. The CB kindly provided us the financial 
statements of the'100 randomly selected pawnshops. Secondary 
data were obtained from the Central Bank (CB), previous studies 
by the former Technical Board for Agricultural Credit (TBAC), and 
other recent studies on ICMs by other researchers, notably Floro 
(1986), Geron (1988), and Swaminathan (1982). From the data bank 
of SWS, the raw data from the 1987 survey of small enterprises in 
the informal sector of three (3) municipalities in Metro Manila 
were made available for this study. 
The data of the nationwide surveys jointly implemented by 
the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and the Ateneo University in 
1986 and 1987 were also made available to the study. The surveys 
polled 1,200 voting age adult respondents, distributed as 
follows: Metro Manila - 300; balance of Luzon - 390; Visayas 
300; and Mindanao - 300.1/ The locations and respondents were 
drawn at random. The 3ata from these surveys permit us to 
estimate the size and trends in the ICMs from the demand side by 
national, regional, urban, and rural locations as well as by 
economic classification o£ families. Population weights were 
applied to get the nationwide estimates of the size of the 
informal credit markets. 
This integrative report is organized along the following 
major topics mentioned above. The major findings of individual 
studies related to the abovementioned topics are covered in this 
report. 
II. MAJOR STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS, POLICY AND 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND SIZE AND TRENDS IN SIZE 2/ 
A. Structure of the Informal Credit Markets 
To define the major structure of the informal credit markets 
the lyne between the formal and informal markets should first be 
drawn. 
We use the criterion of flexibility to identify segments of 
the financial system that belong to the ICMs and the FCMs. ICMs 
are flexible because they function "outside the purview of 
V Nationwide sample size margin of error for ratio estimate 
is 2.9 percent; for regional sample, it is 5.8 percent. For 
details on the methodology and reliability, see Ateneo-SWS Public 
Opinion Report II and III, October 1986 and March 1987, and POR 
IV, October 1987 Survey. 2/ 
This section draws heavily from the Latnberte (1988) and 
Agabin (1988) studies. 
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regulations imposed on the formal sector with respect to capital, 
reserves and liquidity requirements, ceilings on lending and 
deposit rates, mandatory credit targets, and audit and,, reporting 
requirements" (Ghate 1986). In the Philippines, only the Central 
Bank imposes such regulations on financial intermediaries 
directly under its supervision. We may then say that financial 
intermediaries which do not fall under the direct supervision of 
the Central Bank belong to the ICMs. 
Given the above definition, we can classify two groups of 
participants in the ICMs. One group consists of those which are 
registered with a particular government agency but ace exempted 
by law from regulations imposed by the Central Bank. An example 
of this would be cooperative credit unions. The other group is 
composed of financial intermediaries which are not registered as 
such with any government agency. If registered and authorized by 
the CB, then they will be subjected to CB regulations because of 
the very nature of their operations. Note that they are not 
necessarily illegal in the sense that sanctions can be applied to 
them once they become known to authorities. Central Bank 
regulations and sanctions can be extended only to officially 
registered financial intermediaries with it. 
Note that some of the formal financial intermediaries 
registered with the Central Bank are less regulated than others. 
Thus, they achieve a greater degree of flexibility almost similar 
to that of completely unregulated participants* These are 
represented by institutions like the pawnshops, lending 
investors, nonstock savings and loans associations (NSSLAs) and 
moneyshops. Because of their flexibility, they are included in 
our study of ICMs. 
Viewed from a distance, it cannot be said that the financial 
system in the Philippines is dualistic. Instead, it can best be 
described as a continuum, with participants in the financial 
markets regulated at varying degrees. 
In the Philippines, quite a number of regulatory changes 
have been effected through the years. It is worth. noting that 
financial intermediaries which once operated outside of CB 
regulations are now registered with and supervised by it. 
Examples of this are the so-called nonbank financial 
intermediaries (NBFIs). 
A description of the Philippine financial system and a brief 
review of its regulatory environment can help* clarify these 
issues. The financial system can best b@ described by grouping 
financial intermediaries under the regulatory agency(ies) 
directly supervising them (See Figure 1). 
The Central Bank was explicitly given the mandate to oversee 
all banking institutions. Its control over banking institutions 
was meant to ensure the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
6 
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instruments. The usual regulations, such as minimum capital and 
reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, etc., were applied 
to these institutions. As the economy grew, the financial system 
became more sophisticated. Thus, in the 1960s, several 
companies/entities registered with specific government agencies 
participated in the credit markets without being regulated by the 
Central Bank. New financial instruments, called deposit 
substitutes, started to emerge in the market. All these 
innovations arose as a response to the below equilibrium ceiling 
on interest rates (Lamberte 1988). 
On the basis of the nature of their operations, tne 
registered financial institutions may be grouped into three broad 
categories, namely: 1) institutions which regularly engage in 
the lending of funds obtained from the public in the form of 
deposits; 2) institutions which regularly engage in the lending 
of funds obtained from the public through the issuance of their 
own debt instruments other than deposits, such as acceptances, 
promissory notes, participations, etc.; and 3) institutions 
which regularly engage in the lending of funds but do not obtain 
funds from the public (either as deposits or their own debt 
instruments). The second and third groups are called non-bank 
financial intermediaries (NBFls). Of the three groups, only the 
first was under the supervision of the Central Bank before 1972. 
The rest were not regulated by the Central Bank, although they 
were registered with other government agencies (e.g.. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Department of Trade and Industry), and 
as such could then be considered as segments of the ICMs. 
The phenomenal growth of the NBFIs, specially in the 1960s, 
caused a major decline in the volume of total resources of the 
financial system subject to the direct control of the Central 
Bank. Funds shifted to the NBFIs because they paid interest 
rates much higher than the regulated rates. This threatened the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The 1972 financial reforms 
tried to correct this weakness by putting all banking 
institutions and NBFIs under the control and supervision of the 
Central Bank. According to the Central Bank definition, NBFls 
include: 
(a) A person or entity licensed and/or registered with any 
government regulatory body as a nonbaojj: : Jfipa^cial 
intermediary, such as an investment hous£, investment 
company, financing company, securities "d©^le?/broker, 
lending investor, pawnshop, money broker, funds manager, 
cooperative, insurance company, nonstock savings and loan 
association, and building and loan association. (6) A person 
or entity which holds itself out as a nonbanking financial 
intermediary, such as by the use of a business name, which 
includes the term "financing," "finance," "investment," 
"lending" and/or word/phrase of similar import which 
connotes financial intermediation, or an entity which 
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advertises itself as a financial intermediary, and is 
engaged in a function where financial intermediation is 
implied. 
In general, NBFIs. are not allowed to borrow from the public. 
The term "public" refers to twenty or more creditors at any one 
time. However, NfeFIs may obtain a license to have "quasi-
banking" functions, in which case they are allowed to borrow from 
the public provided that deposits are not among the debt 
instruments they issue. 
All the financial institutions which are under the 
supervision of the Central Bank belong to the formal credit 
markets. They are all subject to the minimum capital 
requirement, although this varies across different types of 
financial entities. For example, banks have higher capital 
requirements than non-banking institutions. Their debt 
instruments are subject to a specific reserve requirement ratio. 
Their borrowings and loan portfolio, particularly DOSRI accounts 
(i.e., loans to its directors, officers, stockholders, and 
related interests), are frequently monitored by the CB. 
Supervision includes not only the mere issuance of rules, but 
visitorial powers as well so that regulations can be fully 
implemented, and if violated, sanctions can be effectively 
imposed on violators. 
It is then clear that in the Philippines finance companies, 
pawnshops, moneyshops, HSSLAs, and lending investors belong to 
the FCMs. However, they are less regulated than banks. 
Pawnshops and lending investors (Lis) are the important ones 
in the small loans market. It requires only a minimum capital 
of 00,000 to s€t up one. Pawnshops have mushroomed all over, 
extending micro loans on the basis of pawns, usually pieces of 
jewelry and other articles of value, often for emergency needs of 
households and individuals. Pawnshops are required to set up 
shops wherein to conduct their business and to provide safety 
facilities for the safekeeping of the pawns. 
Similarly, lending investors (Lis) provide relatively small 
loans, many on clean basis for business and consumption purposes 
to small firms, businesses, and wage employees. They are active 
in offices, public market places, and town centers where they 
extend loans to small businessmen under a daily collection 
scheme, in offices, they extend salary loans which are collected 
through payroll deduction or by a collector who makes the regular 
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rounds on paydays. They have very simple operations and employ 
two to five people.V 
As of end of 1987, the average resources of an LI were less 
than a million pesos (p772,686), while the average loan volume 
was about £600,000. Majority (74%) of the 443 Lis which' 
registered with the CB toward the end of 1987 are under single 
proprietorship; 25 percent are corporations, and one percent, 
partnership. 
In a way, Lis are a crossbreed of sort. They operate like 
the nonstock savings and loan associations (NSSLAs), which is 
another type of nonbank financing institution, except that Lis 
can go to other offices to extend loans. Virtually unregulated, 
the only requirements imposed by the CB on lending investors are 
a minimum paid-in capital of £100,000, the submission of the 
quarterly financial statements and annual reports, and the 
biodata of officers. To register with the CB, only the 
submission of the organizational papers is necessary, while only 
a municipal license is needed in the case of single 
proprietorship. The CB merely acknowledges receipt of 
requirements. Lis are not audited by the CB, either. However, 
being registered, Lis enjoy the protection of the law of the 
land, unlike informal moneylenders. 
NSSLAs are like credit unions. They are allowed by law to 
accept deposits from and grant loans limited to members only. 
However, they fqllow the corporate law in the sense < that those 
who have more shares will have greater say in the running of the 
corporation, whereas credit unions follow the "one man, one vote" 
principle. 
Insurance companies, both government and public, have never 
been under the supervision of the Central Bank. The Insurance 
Commission, which is an independent body, is empowered to 
regulate insurance companies. It is to be noted that insurance 
companies also engage in direct lending, although it is still 
limited to their own members. Their funds come mainly from the 
sale of insurance policies, not from the issuance of debt 
instruments similar to those issued by the NBFIs.- However, 
insurance companies are required to submit financial statistics 
to the Central Bank. The purpose is to ascertain the effects of 
their operations on the monetary, credit, and exchange situation 
of the country, and not to supervise them. Since this allows the 
3/ 
An officer of the CB-Department of Financial 
Intermediaries relayed the observation to this author that a 
number of informal money lenders have registered with the CB as 
lending investors. They may have been encouraged to do so by the 
liberalization of the financial policy on interest rates. * 
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Central Bank to maintain its control over total liquidity of the 
system, insurance companies may be considered part of the FCMs.4/ 
Another group of financial institutions are the cooperative 
credit unions (CCUs). They are registered with the Bureau of 
Cooperative Development (BCOD), now knowrt as the Bureau of 
Agricultural Cooperatives Development (BACOD). Some of the CCUs 
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
CCUs operate like mutual savings and loans associations, raising 
deposits from their members to lend to their own members. Except 
banks under the Rural Banking Act, CCUs are not under the 
supervision of the Central Bank. Neither are they required to 
submit reports to the CB. The BACOD is empowered to regulate 
CCUs. However, its functions are minimal and do not include a 
monitoring of the loan portfolio or the imposition of reserve 
requirements and intermediation taxes. Thus, CCUs operate 
virtually free of any regulations imposed by the Central Bank on 
the financial intermediaries under its jurisdiction. Also, CCUs 
are not monitored by the Central Bank. As a result, they haVe 
greater flexibility compared to financial intermediaries 
operating under Central Bank rules. In view of the foregoing, 
CCUs can be considered as a segment of the ICMS. 
Aside from CCUs, many other institutions and individuals 
perform financial intermediation functions. Some of them raise 
deposits for on-lending; many use their own funds. Still, others 
use external aid funds or funds from the government treasury for 
on-lending purposes. To the extent that they are not subject to 
CB regulations, they are considered segments of the ICM. These 
intermediaries include the "paluwagan" (Philippine version of a 
ROSCA), trader/miller-lenders, farmer-lenders, manufacturer-
lenders, service supplier-lenders, and professional moneylenders. 
It is also to be noted that some governmental entities, 
private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) perform on-lending functions. Spawned by 
the environment in the 1970s and 1980s, thfese entities have had 
to implement essentially ad hoc lending programs as components of 
their organizational objectives and implementation programs 
(Agabin 1988, Lava, et al. 1988). 
Examples of government agencies whose lending activities do 
not pass through the banks are: the Office of Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA), which administers the Welfare Fund 
collections from departing overseas workers; the National 
Electrification Administration (NEA), which provides loans to 
V 
Insurance firms, are tnow becoming active writing debt 
contracts to non^members. Wot ex£mple,SSS recently approved 
loans ot pi.0 billion each to two (2) firms. 
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electric cooperatives; the Southern Philippines Development 
Authority (SPDA), which provides credit, technical, and marketing 
assistance to poultry contract growers in the Mindanao regions; 
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which implements a 
direct loan assistance to settlers; the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development (DSWD), which provides urban and rural 
poor with credit and extension services; the Quedan Guarantee 
Fund Board (QGFB), which directly lends government funds to 
grains wholesale traders and millers for on-lending to farmers; 
and the Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), which 
handles a credit program called the Urban Livelihood Financing 
Program to support micro/small enterprises belonging to the low-
income sector. 
Figure 2 depicts the broad structure of the informal credit 
markets in the Philippines in terms of the intermediation 
functions they perform, sourcing of funds, and linkage with the 
other markets. 
Most informal lenders have only a small circle of clientele 
and volume of loans; they operate in a circumscribed area, or in 
a specific niche of the market where personal knowledge of 
borrowers is possible. A large proportion of the loans they 
provide are reported being used for productive purposes. Small 
lenders rely mostly on their own savings while some raise funds 
from deposits. These points will be elaborated further in later 
sections. 
It can, however, be said that the ICM structure basically 
reflects the extended family system and social structure. 
Kinship, friendship, and other personal ties underpin a large 
portion of informal loans: 30.0.to 60.0 percent of the amount of 
informal farm indebtedness (Agabin 1988); up to 78.0 percent in 
the small enterprise business sector (ISSI 1985); and up to 66.0 
percent of borrowers in the underground micro business 
enterprises (Gatchalian, et al. 1986). Family and social ties 
also partly explain why around 25.0 percent of the informal loans 
are non-interest bearing. Sometimes, the loans take the form of 
long-term equity, or become part of the coping or survival 
mechanism of the social system. Homogeneity and other common 
ties also characterize the system of credit cooperatives, the 
"paluwagan" (ROSCAS), and other informally organized savings and 
lending clubs. 
It can be surmised from the above that not all suppliers of 
informal loans are operating for profit or doing financial 
intermediation on a regular basis. Pieces of evidence suggest 
that up to one-fourth of the informal lenders are non-commercial 
lenders (Lava, et al. 1988, Mangahas 1989, TBAC 1981). 
By locale, the dominant suppliers of informal loans vary 
according to the important economic activities in the area. For 
instance, richer farmers who jnay have the ability to integrate 
12 
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other economic activities with farming are now a major source of 
credit in palay farming areas where landlords used to be one of 
the primary sources. In coconut-based areas, vegetable traders 
are important in vegetable producing communities. In urban areas 
and in the manufacturing sector, trade credits appear big. 
Lamberte and Jose (1988) found trade credits from input 
suppliers, wholesalers, and footwear manufacturers to be a large 
portion of financing in the footwear industry of Narikina. 
The foregoing pieces of information serve to underscore a 
number of things. First, ICMs underpin the credit requirements 
of a large part of the economy. Second, the ICM structure has 
been dynamic and has responded to the impulses of change in the 
economic, credit, and social environments. 
B. Policy and Legal Environment 
The Philippine financial policy environment has been greatly 
altered in the past two decades. The change has been generally 
from a policy regime that tended to repress the development of 
the financial system to one that promotes a market-oriented 
financial development. In 1980, a set of financial reforms was 
introduced, including the removal of interest rate ceilings and 
the reduction of differentiation among types of financial 
institutions to encourage more competition in the financial 
markets. Toward the later part of 1985, the Central Bank started 
to align the rediscounting rate with the market rate. Similarly, 
about half of the special credit programs were phased out. In 
agriculture, funds for such special lending programs have been 
consolidated mostly for loan guarantee facilities to encourage 
banks to use their own funds for lending to farmers^ 
Restrictive regulations still remain, howev&£. The 
existing regulations on branching and credit portfolio 
allocations are examples of such. Moreover, intermediation taxes 
are still imposed in the form of 5.0 percent gross receipts tax 
on loans that drive a wedge between deposit and lending rates. 
Past monetary and credit policies partly reflected the 
biases against informal lenders and practices in the-^ICMs. These 
biases were enshrined in a number of legislations. The most 
prominent example is the Anti-Usury Law of 1916, now repealed by 
virtue of legislations issued in 1973 and ea'rly 1980s. 
Specialized financing institutions were also established to 
address the problem of lack of access to credit especially among 
the rural and agricultural populace. 1 
Hence, at least over the past three decades, the authorities 
followed a supply-leading approach. Highly specialized financial 
institutions under government control were created. Special 
credit programs with below market rates and liberal loan 
guarantees were utilized to increase the flow of credit to the 
countryside and other priority sectors. All financial 
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institutions were also required to allocate 25.0 percent of their 
loanable funds generated for lending to agricultural borrowers 
in general, and to agrarian reform beneficiaries in particular. 
The kind of monetary and credit policies between the 1970 
and 1986 is well reflected in the movements of real rediscounts 
and advances from the Central Bank and loans from the formal 
financial system. Monetary policy was generally expansionary 
from 1974 to 1981, with peaks in 1975 and 1978. This was the era 
of liberal access to the rediscounting window of the Central Bank 
when rediscount funds could be obtained for as low as 1.0 to 3.0 
percent. This was also a period when foreign borrowings became a 
significant source of loanable funds, and when special credit 
programs for sectors considered as priority also proliferated. 
Monetary policy became highly contractionary in 1984 and 
1985 as the country underwent the worst economic crisis in the 
post-war era. The financial crisis resulted in the closure of 
some banks and non-bank financial institutions. The problems 
with the country's balance of payments and budget deficits had 
been pestering the economy. Inflation rates soared to 50.4 
percent in 1984, declined to 23.0 percent the following year, and 
became very minimal in 1986. In real terms, loans from the 
banking system was shrinking from 1984 up to 1986. But positive 
growth began to be reflected in 1987, when the economy 
experienced an upturn following two years of negative growth. 
The surveys and case studies of informal suppliers of credit 
disclose that a substantial proportion of them became lenders 
only either during or after the crisis period (Lava, et al. 
1988; Mangahas 1989). Moreover, within the formal financial 
structure, the segment which is least regulated expanded rather 
rapidly during the period when the rest of the system seemed to 
have receded. Among the institutions in this segment are the 
pawnshops (Lamberte 1988), credit unions (Lamberte 1988), and 
lending investors (Agabin 1988). 
C. Size and Trends in Size of the ICMs 
Nationwide Estimate of Size 
The size of the ICMs is first estimated from the demand side 
at the level of the household. Two measurements are used, 
namely, the amount of borrowings and the proportion of the 
borrowing population who are informal credit users. This is done 
nationwide, by urban and rural dimension, and by economic status. 
We used the data from the nationwide surveys of the Social 
Weather Stations - Ateneo de Manila University in October 1986 
and October 1987. Proper weights were applied to get the 
population values. 
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Having done the above, estimates of size from the supply 
side are then presented. Indicative figures are derived from 
studies undertaken under this ADB-sponsored research project. 
The data from either the demand and supply side indicate 
the extent of lending activities taking place in the informal 
credit markets. 
The total household borrowings in one year is estimated to 
reach j?45.0 billion in 1987. informal loans amount to ?26.5 
billion or 59.0 percent of the total (Table 1). This informal 
loan amount is equivalent to ^8.8 billion loans outstanding.5/ 
Close to 10 million adults or 35.0 percent of the voting age 
adults borrowed in 1987. Of the borrowers, informal users 
comprised 66.0 percent (Table 2). A big portion of the 
borrowers obtained small loans only in the range of £1,000 to 
£12,500 (formal - 83.0 percent; informal - 93.0 percent). Formal 
loans averaged £5,225; informal borrowings averaged £4,040. 
The average loan size in the informal sector obtained in 
the nationwide survey appears to be high compared to those 
obtained by micro studies. For example, Lamberte (1986) found 
that the average size of loans granted by pawnshops in 1986 was 
£418, while Lamb&rte and Bunda (1988) showed that most loans 
granted by moneylenders in 1987 were less than £2,000. It is 
possible that the nationwide survey has captured both the large 
and small segments of the informal credit markets, whereas the 
micro studies have limited themselves only to the small segments. 
The community studied by Lamberte and Bunda is one of the most 
economically depressed areas in tne country. By its very nature 
the pawnshop market is basically small. However, in the case of 
credit union members in Metro Manila, Lamberte and Balbosa (1988) 
found that the average loan size in 1987 was £2}.,760. 
Relative to the total claims by the banking system on the 
private sector, the proportion of informal Indebtedness by the 
households is only 9.0 percent. It is to be notjed, however, that 
corporate accounts make up around 70.0 percent Of the loans from 
commercial banks. Commercial bank loans comprise the bulk of 
total credit from banks. To make our data comparable, we exclude 
the corporate accounts portion since our data on informal loans 
are largely made up of small loans to individuals. The result 
shows that the proportion of informal loans to private 
individual loan portfolio of the banking system is 23.0 percent. 
5/ 
Derived by using turnover rate of three (3). Most ICM 
loans mature in four (4) to five (5) months. (See ACES 1988, 
Mangahas 1989, Lava, et al. 1988, Geron 1988). 
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Note, however, that the banking system's individual loan 
portfolio includes accounts which are very large relative to the 
size of loans in the ICMs. The estimates were therefore refined 
further based on the distribution of bank loans by sectoral 
activities. The "small" private individual loans from the 
banking system are estimated to be about 60.0 percent of the 
claims on private individuals, largely on account of the rural 
banks, specialized government banks, and the state-owned 
Philippine National Bank.6/ These amount to some £17.5 billion 
loans outstanding in 1986. With this, the ratio of ICM loans to 
"small" formal loans is 50.4 percent. "Small" is roughly defined 
here as loans of £25,000 and below (Table 3). 
In relation to the loans made by selected segments of the 
banking system, the total value of informal loans (flow data) is 
eight (8) times the loans granted by the rural banking system in 
1987. in terms of loans outstanding the ratio of ICM loans to 
rural bank loans is 127.0 percent in 1987. There are roughly 20 
ICM borrowers to one rural bank borrower. 
The comparison of informal loans obtained by households can 
be rendered more meaningful if we relate their magnitude to the 
loans from the borderline institutions in the formal credit 
markets (FCMs) - the lending investors, pawnshops, and JJSSLAs. 
By the end of 1987, the combined loans outstanding of these 
institutions totaled £3.03 billion. The amount of informal loans 
converted to stock data, is three (3) times this total. 
Size of Rural and Urban ICMs 
The 1986 and 1987 SWS survey data on the incidence and size 
of borrowings by locale and economic status confirm the 
assertion that the informal credit markets play a particularly 
important role in channeling credit to small borrowers in the 
urban and rural areas. 
The sizes of rural and urban household indebtedness are 
shown in Table 4. The total rural ICM loans in 1987 is twice the 
size of urban ICM loans, with £17.7 billion and £8.8 billion in 
loans taken, respectively. 
By urban and ryral dimension, the ratio of borrowers to 
population differs only slightly (36.0 percent in Metro Manila, 
33.0 percent other urban areas, and 36.0 percent in rural 
areas). However, the 1987 data suggest greater accessibility to 
formal sources in urban areas outside of Metro Manila. The urban 
informal borrowing ratio is four (4) out of 10 borrowers. In 
6/ 
Rural banks are small unit countryside banks which are 
widely spread in the Philippine rural areas. 
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Table 3: RATIO OF INFORMAL LOANS TO LOANS TO PRIVATE SECTOR AND 
INDIVIDUALS BY THE BANKING SYSTEM AND BY SELECTED NBFIs 
(Amount in Billion Pesos) 
AMOUNT 
A. Loans & Advances of Deposit Money Banks to 
Private Businesses or Individuals in 1986 a/ 97. 1 
Less: Corporate Accounts (70%) 69. 4 
B. Equals: Loans & Advances to individuals 29. 1 
C. Informal Loans to Households 
C.l. Loans Taken 26. 5 
C.2. Loans Outstanding (LO) Equivalent of C.l 8. 8 
(turnover rate: 3) 
D. Ratio of Informal LO to Banks' Total Outstanding 
Loans & Advances to Private Sector (A) 9. 0% 
E. Ratio of Informal LO to Banks' Loans to Individuals (B) 30. 0% 
F. Ratio of Informal Loans (C.2) to Banks' "Small" Lo^ns 
to.Individuals b/ 50. 4% 
G. Ratio of Informal Loans to 
1986: Loans Outstanding of RBs (P6.5 billion) 123. 0% 
1987: Loans Outstanding of RBs (P6.9 billion) 126. 0% 
H. Ratio of Informal Loans (C.2) to LO of 
1986: Pawnshops + Lis + NSSLAs (1.923 billion) c/ 456. 0% 
1987: Pawnshops + Lis + NSSLAs (3.032 billion) 290. 0% 
a/ End of 1986 data; 1987 disaggregated data not yet available, 
b/ "Small" loans defined as loans ^>25,000 & below. Loans above 
£12,000 comprise 43.0% of total loans taken by households from formal 
sources. For purposes of our computation & using institutional data, 
we have assumed that 60% of banks' loans to individuals are "small" 
(£29.1 billion x .60 = £17.46 billion). This assumption may be on 
the high side. 
c/ Pawnshops, £ 0.74 billion; Lis, £ 0.19 billion; NSSLAs, 
£ 0.993 billion (end of 1986). 
Sources of basic data: 
Central Bank (CB). Annual Report, 1986. 
Central Bank (CB). Fact Book, 1987. 
SWS-Ateneo University, f u o u c Opinion Reports Survey Data, 
October 1987. 
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Table 4: AMOUNT & DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY SOURCE OF CREDIT, 
URBAN & RURAL PHILIPPINES, October 1987 Survey 
(Amount in Billion Pesos) 
ALL PHILIPPINES URBAN a/ RURAL 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Formal 15.2 34.0 9.5 48.0 5.8 23.0 
Informal 26.5 59.0 8.8 45.0 17.7 70.0 
Mixed 3.2 7.0 1.3 7.0 1.9 7.0 
TOTAL 44.9 100.0 19.6 100.0 25.4 2377.0 
% Share 100.0 44.0 56.0 
a/ Including Metro Manila. 
Source of basic data: SWS-Ateneo University. Public Opinion 
Report Survey Data, October, 1987. 
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both Metro Manila and the rural areas, the ratio is six ( 6 ) 
informal borrowers out of 10 borrowers. The tiata for Metro 
Manila may appear surprising at first glance sintite Metro Manila 
has the highest density of financial institutions to population 
and it is where over 80.0,percent of total institutional loans 
are booked. As we noted earlier, however, the bulk of the formal 
loans are corporate accounts, which when excluded substantially 
reduce the bank claims on private individuals. 
From 1986 to 1987, there was an increase in borrowing 
activities, but the portion pf formal borrowings declined. The 
source of the reduction in 1987 came from the rural^areas where 
borrowers from formal sources decreased substantially, while 
informal borrowers increased significantly. 
Rural Informal Credit Markets. In the rural areas, ICM 
loans comprise 70.0 percent of the total amount of borrowings 
reported by rural households. In relation to the agricultural 
loans granted by the banking system, the ratio of Informal loans 
to bank loans is high at 64.0 percent. In terms o^ stock data, 
the ratio of ICM loans to agricultural loans, excluding corporate 
loans, is 46.5 percent (See Table 5). 
Micro level studies of rural villages have found even higher 
proportions of household indebtedness from informal lenders as 
evidenced in Table 6. On the supply side, there is a high 
density ratio of rural ICM lenders to population. Th© 1987 
Survey of six Nueva Ecija barangays (barrio or village) foi\ this 
study found a total of 300 informal lenders operating in the six 
barangays anytime during 1972 to 1987. Some 210 were classified 
as active lenders, implying an average of 35 lenders per village 
of about 100 to 150 households (ACES 1988). Most of these lenders 
operate in one (1) to four (4) villages; some in as much as 10 
villages. On the average, they lend to some 20 to 37 clients. 
Most come from towns within the province of Nueva Ecija, which is 
one of the major rice granaries in Luzon* But S few of the 
informal lenders come from other provinces like Bulacan, 
Pampanga, and Isabela. All these provinces are located in Luzon, 
with Isabela which is in the northernmost region in Luzon being 
the farthest from Nueva Ecija. It would appear that the lending 
activities of those coming from other provinces are linked to 
the trading of agricultural products. 
It is interesting that this historical study of village 
credit underscores the autonomous nature of the indigenous system 
of informal lending. The borrowing pattern by rural households 
in terms of credit sourcing was only momentarily disrupted 
during the initial years of the implementation of the biggest 
credit program for rice (Masagana 99) and vegetable producers 
(Gulayan sa Kalusugan or GSK). This observation is affirmed by 
data on the participation of 46 informal lender respondents 
operating in these villages. it was found that the 
implementation of the government lending programs hardly affected 
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Table 5: THE SIZ£ OF ICM AS RATIO TO FORMAL BANK LOANS, 
RURAL AND URBAN AREAS, 1987 
(Amount in Billion Pesos) 
• • • • • • 
AMOUNT 
I. RURAL ICM IN RELATION TO FORMAL BANK LOANS, 1987 
A. 1987 Loans Outstanding (LOJ to Agric. by Battles : 23.0 
B. Net of Corporate Loans (44% Corp. Loans) : 12.9 
C. Rural ICM Borrowings 1987 
C.l. Granted : 17.7 
C.2. Outstanding Equivalent a/ : 6.0 
D. Ratio of ICM to FCM 
D.l. Ratio to A : 26.1 
D.2. Ratio to B : 46.5 
E. Ratio ICM Loans Taken to Loans Granted in Agric. : 64.0% 
by Banks 
II. URBAN ICM IN RELATION TO FORMAL BANK LOANS, 1987 
A. 1987 LO to selected sector^ : 59.1 B. Net of corporate accounts £63% corp.) : 21.6 C. Urban ICM 
C.l. Loans taken : 8.8 
C.2. Loans outstanding equivalent a/ : 2.9 
D. Ratio of urban ICM to Formal Bank: 2.9/21.6 : 14.0% 
a/ Assumes turnover of 3 in a year; with 4 months average length 
of maturity but actually could be longer. 
Source of basic data: 
Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP). Annual Report, 1987. 
Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP). Statistical Bulletin, 
1986 & 1985. ; 
SWS-Ateneo University. Public Opinion Reports Survey Data, 
October 1987. 
Table 6: SUHHARY OF STUDIES INDICATING EXTENT OF BORROWING FROM FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOURCES a/ 
(In X of Total Nuiber of Loans or Borrowers) 
Credit Source (Z) (Z) 
Period Author/Year of Nuaber of Loans/ 
Covered Publication or Release Borrower-Respondents Portal Informal Hixed 
1954-55 de Guzian (1957) 2,411 loans 12.8 flflif 
1957-58 Gapud (1958) 256 loans 18.8 
1957-58 Sacay (1961) 916 loans 13.8 87,8 
1968-61 BCS (1963) 1,679,888 loans 7.8 92.2 
1967-70 llangahas (1975) 151 borrowers 11.9 88.1 
1978-71 Nangahas (1975) 297 borrowers 28.9 79.1 
1969-78 Alaario (1978) 133 loans 37.7 62.3 
1969-78 Balagot (1974) 134 borrowers 21.6 78.4 
1973 DA (1974) 628 loans 51.3 48.7 
1973-74 PCARR-BAEcon (1974) 3,384 bans 92.2 b/ 7.8 
1974 Cigaral (1977) 421 borrowers 94.8 6.8 
1975-76 DA 
Iloilo (Feb. 1977) 341 loans 82.7 17,3 
Ilocos (Jan. 1977) 783 loans 67.6 32*4 
Zaeboanga (Apr. 1977) 551 loan5 74.6 25.4 
1976 DA (1976) 268 faraers 17.2 82.8 
1977 UPBRF (1977) 1,879 loans 36.9 63.1 
1977 BA (1977) 485 faraers 5.2 94.8 
1977 TBAC (1978) 656 borrowers 25.8 74.2 
1977-78 Laopao t Latorre (1979) 41 fi5heraen 29.3 78.7 
1978 DA (1978) 338 faraers 3.8 96.2 
1978 TBAC (1981) 2,118 loans 17.4 02*4 
1979 Banalo (1979) 283 cattle 
raisers 
54.7 45.3 
1979-88 NIA-SSV (1988) 299 faraers 28.8 Kaft 
1988 Capistrano (1982) 41 village 
households 
2.1 c/ 97.9 c/ 
1981-82 TBAC (1986) 871,688 loans 48.2 59.8 
626,388 faraers 34.8 58.7 7.3 
1983-84 Floro (1986) 111 fara 
house-
holds d/ 
448 loans 
.9 
8.8 
99.1 
92 A 
(Qantinued next page) 
Credit Source it) (Z) 
Period Author/Year ttf matter of Loans/ 
Covered Publication or Release Borrower-Respondents Formal Inforaal Mixed 
1984 UP ISSI (1989) 146 5aall and 
aediua 
scale en" 
trepreneurs 
60.3 28.8 11.0 
1985 NEDA (1987) 381,4W e/ 20.7 79.3 
1986 Ateneo-Social 
Meather Stations 
9.583 M persons 
of voting 
age 
32.1 64.9 3.0 
1987 -da- 10.322 H persons 
of voting 
age 
28.4 65.7 5.9 
19B7 Geron (1988) 1,798 faraer-
borrowers 
3.0 97.0 
3/ Data cosparability is liaited by differences in saapling. 
b/ Samples Mere drawn fros list of borrowers of banks which explains the high percentage 
of loans froe the foraal sector. 
d Out of 48 responses. Sose borrowers had sore than one source of credit, 
d/ The respondents were all borrowers. 
el Borrowers-respondents availed of credit anytime froa 1975 to 1985. 
H = Billion * 
Sources: 
1. Adapted from: Sacay, Agabin, & Tanchoco. Shall Farmer Credit Dileaaa, 1985. 
2. Ateneo-SNS. Oct. 1986 & Oct. 1987 Survey data. 
3. Capistrano, Ana Doris N. "Study of A Village Econoay: The Case of Villarica, Pantabangan, 
Nueva Ecija." U . S . thesis, U.P. at Los Bancs, 1982. 
4. Floro, Sagrario 1. "Credit Relations and Market Interlinkage in Philippine Agriculture." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1986. 
5. Seron, Ma. Piedad. 'Philippine Informal Rural Credit Markets: Efficienty and Equity Issues." 
Paper presented at the Workshop on Policy Considerations for Structural Changes and 
Developaent in the Agricultural Sector; sponsored by the Agricultural Policy Research 
6. Laopao, Nanuel and Latcrre,JEstrella. Saall-Scile Fishing in Leyte Province: A Socio-Econoaic 
Survey. Economics Researth Report, BAEcen, Series No. 8, October 1979. 
7. Manalo, Leonardo. "Credit Program for Cattle Raisers in Cagayan Valley." Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Centro Escolar University* 1979. 
8. NEDA. "A Study on Governaent Assistance tD'Low-Incoae Broups with Inadequate Access to 
Institutional Credit, 1985." 1987. 
9. UP ISSI. "Financial Factors and Seall and Medium Industries in the Philippines.' 1985. 
IB. TBAC. A Study on the Inforaal Rural Financial Markets in Three Selected Provinces of the 
Philippines. Manila, 1981. 
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their participation in the ICM. Some 14 lenders were already in 
the market prior to 1966. Seven (7) lenders entered the market 
during 1966-1970 after the fertilizer-responsive varieties of 
rice were introduced to farmers. Another seven (7) became 
lenders within 1971-1975, during which time the M-99 and GSK 
programs of formal credit for rice and vegetable farmers began to 
be implemented and reached peak lending volume. One-third or 16 
of the 46 respondent informal lenders became lenders within 1976-
1985. By 1987, at the time of the interview, only four (4) of 
the lender-respondents have stopped lending for reasons of 
bankruptcy, decision to invest in other business, or to simply 
get out of the credit business. By 1987, government's lending 
program had already become very minimal due to repayment 
difficulties and changes in policy direction. 
Data for 30 of the 46 lender-informants showed total 
operating capital of £1.43 million by 1987 (August), for an 
average of £47,667 per lender in nominal terms. The average 
volume of loans made in 1987 was £82,023 nominally. This is 3.5 
times the level in 1972, 2.5 times that of 1975, and close to 
twice the level in 1980 (See Table 7). The high inflation rates, 
however, reduced the volume of informal loans in the 1980s to 
levels lower than those in 1972 or 1973. For example, the real 
values of the 1984 and 1985 average volume per lender were only a 
third of the 1973 value. The nominal and real values increased 
significantly though by 1986. 
It is worthwhile to note that the decline in the volume of 
lending per lender in real terms coincided with the increase in 
the number of borrower per lender over the same period. It means 
that lenders are lending out lesser amount in real terms to a 
greater number of borrowers. This deserves setae comments. 
Agricultural loans granted by the formal banking sector in real 
terms expanded and reached a peak of £9 billion in 198 3-. It went 
down in the subsequent years as a result of the crisis. By 1987, 
the agricultural loans granted by the banking system amounted to 
only £3.7 billion in real terms. Note that special credit 
programs for agriculture proliferated up until 1983. What this 
suggests is that the expansion of formal agricultural credit in 
real terms during the period could have led to the decline in the 
volume and size of loans in real terms of informal moneylenders 
in these areas. The simultaneous drop in the agricultural loans 
granted by the formal banking system and the loan «tze of 
informal moneylenders in real terms after 1983 was mainly caused 
by the economic crisis. 
Past nationwide surveys give a broader indicative picture of 
the trend in the participation of the ICMs in the rural economy. 
This is shown in Table 8. Most of the surveys prior to 1986 
focused on farm households using cross-section data. The 
proportion of borrowers and informal loans were very high in the 
1950s and 1960s when formal financial institutions were not yet 
as widely spread as today. A 1982 survey of farm indebtedness 
Table 7: TOTAL AMD AVERAGE VOLUME OF LOANS GRANTED BY 
INFORMAL MONEYLENDERS DURING YEAR 1972-1967 
(Total n=46), Nominal and Real \fcilues (in P) 
Year 
Number 
of a/ 
Lenders 
Total Loans Average Volume 
Nominal Real c/ Nominal Real c/ 
. 1972 26 597090 597090.0 22965 22965.0 1973 25 759775 643247.5 30391 25729.9 1974 27 762804 493001.2 28252 18259.3 1975 28 901180 537725.1 32185 19204.5 1976 27 1127115 615923.0 41745 22812.0 1977 29 1226903 624303.1 42307 21527.7 1978 31 1407493 655778.3 45403 21154.1 1979 32 1455776 588621.4 45493 18394.4 1980 35 1513645 529460.0 43247 15127.4 1981 35 1446830 456128.8 41338 13032.3 1982 35 1643950 478033.8 46970 13658.1 1983 34 1474249 383870.3 43360 11290.2 1984 35 1774150 309898.1 50690 8854.2 1985 37 1805045 267985.6 48785 7242.9 1986 36 2889144 421667.6 80254 11713.0 1987 26 2132598 299981.4 82023 11537.7 
a/ Number of respondents out of total 46 who reported 
active during the year, 
b/ Up to August. 
c/ Deflated by the GNP deflator * 
Source: ACES Foundation, inc. "The Informal Credit Market 
of Six Selected Barangays in Nueva Ecija 
1972-1987." August 1987. (Table 111-58). 
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showed a decline in the early 1980s. However, the share of 
informal borrowings went upward again in 1986 and in 1987. 
According to SWS survey data, rural ICM borrowers increased 
significantly from 1986 to 1987. In 1987, informal loans 
comprised 70.0 percent of all loans taken by rural households. 
It is to be noted that during the previous years (i.e., 1984-
1986), the country suffered serious economic and financial 
difficulties compounded by a grave political crisis. The formal 
financial system became vGry unstable, and contractionary credit 
policies were adopted by the monetary authorities. Thus, by 1987 
the full effects of the financial crisis of the previous years, 
changes in monetary and credit policies, and serious default 
problems facilitated the collapse of about half of the number of 
rural banks and immobilized two state-owned banks which had an 
important role in agricultural credit. Rural banks supplied 
about half of all formal loans taken by the small farming 
households in cropyear 1981-82 (TBAC 1986). Government banks 
were also reported in the TBAC study as the source of about half 
of the small farm loans during the same year. 
The changes in rural borrowings reflect the structural 
dynamism in the informal credit markets. One finds the 
diminished role of landlord credit and the increasingly 
significant role being played exercised by farmer-lenders/farmer-
trader-lenders, along with trader-lenders in the informal 
markets. Majority (68.0%) of the lenders in the study villages 
of Nueva Ecija reported farming as one of their major sources of 
income. In a separate survey, Geron (1988) also reported a 
majority of farmer-lenders in rice and coconut-based villages she 
studied in 1987. Many of them link credit with trading, thus, 
becoming part of the network of bigger traders in a town. 
The nationwide agrarian reform program for rice and corn 
lands substantially reduced the incidence of landlord credit in 
the rural areas. Th0 changes in rice production technologies in 
the rice sector beginning the second half of the 1960s created 
more demand for loans and an expanded role for lenders 
participating in the product markets. Although input suppliers 
also became an important source of credit in the 1970s, this 
seemed to have beert influenced by the existence of government 
farm lending programs as evidenced by data from the rural village 
credit history (-ACES 1988). The Masagana 99 credit, which 
financed the input portion of paddy production, created a lively 
farm input trading industry during the 1970s. The inputs funded 
with program loans were given in the form of fertilizers and 
pesticides through a chit system or a purchase order which the 
borrower presented to the inptft dealer; the dealer in turn 
collected! payment fi!om the bank. The incidence of loans in the 
form of fertilizer; arid pesticides was more than a third of loans 
obtained by the f&ri^ers during 1973^;197S i this declined to only 
12.0 to 15.0 percent in the succeeding /ears (ACES 1988). Geron 
also found very little input supplier credit to farmers. 
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The credit programs implemented by the government in the 
1960s and 1970s to support food production sufficiency goals 
temporarily reduced the proportion of ICM borrowers. After these 
credit programs receded, richer farmers who havecoabined farming 
with trading seemed to have filled in the gap left by the 
withdrawal of landlord and government credit in the market 
(Agabin 1988) . It is probable that the development of more 
infrastructure facilities such as rural roads, better transport, 
and irrigation has opened up opportunities for so®® farmers to 
participate in the other markets and with it, lending. 
Urban Informal Credit Markets. The SWS survey data indicate 
the share of informal loans to be 45.0 percent the total 
amount of loans obtained by urban households in 19»7. The 1987 
level of informal indebtedness of £8.8 billion incurred by 
families in Metro Manila and other urban locations translate to 
some £3.3 billion loans outstanding. 
The disaggregated data for Metro Manila and balance of urban 
areas give an interesting pattern (See Tables 2 a n d 4 ) . At least 
for 1987, the rest of the urban areas outside of cftetro Manila 
seemed to have enjoyed better access to formal credit facilities 
than either Metro Manila and rural Philippines. This improvement 
coincided with some positive increase in real lpans granted by 
the formal system in 1987 after three previous years of negative 
growth. Data on investments of households fcon* the same 
nationwide surveys also indicate more rapid growth* investment 
in the urban areas than elsewhere during 1987. Sfosbs trend in the 
urban ICM from 1986 to 1987 contrast^ with that ojS the rural 
I CMs. 
To get the ratio of urban ICM loans (Metro Manila included) 
to formal loans reported by banking, institutions ^ ithe 1 Central 
Bank, selected types of loans from the baofcxng isystem .were 
taken together to represent comparable urban formal credit <dafca. 
These loans include those classified in thai Central iBank 
Statistical Bulletin as trade, commercial, consumption, 
manufacturing, and a portion of ,loans lumped under "others." 
With certain adjustments in the 1987; CB data, the ;loa«s . amounted 
to £59.0 billion. After deducting corporate loans (£3.0%), the 
estimate of bank loans outstanding to private: ij^imi-duals and 
small enterprises in the urban sector comes billion. 
Given this, the proportion of urban ICM loans-itctoJiormal urban 
bank loans outstanding, is 14,0 percent. This ®ay be an 
underestimate, however. 
Data on the urban ICM from the supply side &tt$gest 4 a snore 
significant size apd role of informal lenders ini p®«rtaidin$ credit 
to individuals, households, and small enterpr-ifies®our (4.) 
types of informal urban lenders were the subjjeij.fcs&*o£t aas&i-studies 
by Lamberte and other researchers for this prift£ae!t.p< These are 
the "paluwagan," professional moneylenders, cooperativeu .credit 
unions, and trade creditor^. 
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In the urban community of Sapang Palay where no formal 
financial institution operates, 20 active professional 
moneylenders, and 20 "paluwagan" units were found operating. 
Virtually all stallholders in the public market are members of a 
"paluwagan." Also, 20 other professional moneylenders actively 
lend in the community, and the density ratio comes to 860 
households per moneylender. The case study of "paluwagan" units 
found that the 10 urtits were able to raise resources estimated 
to reach £7.2 million in 1987, on a cumulative basis, tfhis shows 
the capacity of "paluwagan" in mobilizing deposits among the 
population with no access to formal financial services. The size 
of the "paluwagan" must be large even in ateas where formal 
financial institutions operate. For example, it was found that 
18.0 percent of the sample members of institution- and market-
based credit unions are also members of a "paluwagan" and 
contributed an average amoumt of £19,096 between January to 
September 1987. 
Cooperative Credit Onions (CCUs) are increasingly becoming 
popular in urban credit markets, particulary in offices and in 
public market places^ They are also fbund in rural locations 
where not even a rural bank exists. They have demonstrated their 
potential for growth and for servicing snSall borrowers especially 
during the financial crisis period of recent years. The CCUs 
grew very rapidly theri to service members' demattd for loans for 
their small businesses and household needs. The counterpart of 
the CCUs in the formal sector, the nonstock savings and loan 
associations (NSSLAs)', also Showed phenomenal growth in resources 
and loans during the crisis period. Data indicate that the CCUs 
are very important as an alternative mechanism to provide 
financial services to people of limited means. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable information about the 
size of the CCUs taken together. A study ih 1987 stated that 
there were •1,469 adtive credit unions in 1980 with a total 
membership of 167,844 (USAID 1987). However, there is no up-to-
date information about their combined assets as well as! their 
sources and uses of funds. The case study of CCUs by Lamberte 
and Balbosa (1988) eh&WS that the combined asisets of 44 maiket-
based credit cooperatives, which are members of the National 
Market Vendors Cooperatives {NAMVESCO), and four institution-
based credit unions amounted to £40*4 million in rtsal terms or 
£278.7 million in nominal terms as of 1986* These are roughly 
28.0 percent of the combined assets of all pawnshops in the 
country that same year. Thus, it can be suridiSed that the tbtai 
of the CCUs as a system is at least as large as that of the 
pawnshops. What is to be noted is that its absolute size is 
growing faster than those of pawnshops and the banking system. 
The figures also suggest that the relative sizes Of the 
unregulated financial intermediaries, namely the CCUs, and one of 
the least regulated financial institutions, i.e., the pawhshops, 
expanded during the crisis periodineemtrast to the highly 
regulated financial institutions (i.e., banking system). 
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The data on trade credits from the flow of funds table 
prepared by the Central Bank show th&t the total availments of 
trade credit by the manufacturing sector in 1986 amounted to 
£22.0 billion in nominal terms. Both the absolute and relative 
sizes of trade credits have been increasing since 1979 and 
reached a peak in 1983, a year before the full efffect of the 
balance of payments crisis was felt, when banks continued to 
reduce their lending activities in 1985 and 1986, the period of 
severe economic instability, the manufacturing sector increased 
its reliance on trade credit. 
The figures on trade credits presented in Table 9 could have 
been grossly underestimated since the flow of funds table made 
use only of data from corporations belonging to the top 1,000. 
In the footwear industry in Marikina where none of the firms 
belong to the top 1000 corporations, trade credits comprise 82.0 
percent of the value of the sales of the sample footwear 
manufacturers and 80.0 percent of the value of their material 
inputs. 
Informal Credit in the Urban Areas. Supplementary survey 
data for 1987 made available by the SWS data bank for this study 
reveal the borrowing pattern of enterprises in tne informal 
sector of three (3) municipalities in Metro Manila (Caloocan 
City, Pasig, and Taguig). Surveyed were some 450 respondents out 
of 2141 census listing of enterprisies with less than 10 workers. 
They were engaged in crafts manufacturing, vending/selling, 
repair services, personal services, professional services, 
construction, and transportation. Among enterprises which 
obtained loans, informal borrowings dominate. About 20.0 percent 
of the respondents borrowed for their initial capital. While 
94.0 percent of the borrowers sourced their loans from relatives 
and friends, about 18.0 percent obtained loans from professional 
moneylenders. Only 12.0 percent borrowed from banks. Merely 3.0 
percent were able to obtain loans from a government lending 
program. It is to be noted that the government, has been 
implementing a number of lending programs for small firms and 
cottage industries, such as the urban Livelihood Financing 
Program of the Technology Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), 
"Balikatan sa Kabuhayan" Program jointly implemented by the TLRC, 
Bagong Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (BKKK), and Land Bank of 
the Philippines (LBP), the Livelihood and Enterprise Development 
program being administered by the national secretarial of the 
BKKK, and the different credit projects under the state-owned 
Livelihood Corporation which are addressed to specific 
disadvantaged sectors, such as women, transport cooperatives, and 
itinerant vendors. 
Availment of trade credit for raw materials purchases were 
reported by 21.3 percent of the respondents for relatively short-
term arrangements extending to 190 days or after disposal of the 
manufactured products. On the other hand, 25.0 percent of the 
respondents were giving credit for goods and services delivered 
Table 9: TYPES OF CREDIT IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1979-1986 
(In Million Pesos) 
Year Loans Trade Credits Total 
1979 112,836.2 
(89.3) 
13,540.5 
(10.7) 
126,376.7 
(100.0) 
1980 115,553.1 
(84.7) 
20,894.1 
(15.3) 
136,447.2 
(100.0) 
1981 129,477.2 
(86.7) 
19,916.3 
(13.3) 
146,393.5 
(100.0) 
1982 140,146.7 
(83.8) 
27,079.0 
(16.2) 
167,225.7 
(100.0) 
1983 155,369.0 
(83.0) 
31,878.8 
(17.0) 
187,247.8 
(100.0) 
1984 119,154.« 
(88.2) 
15,891.0 
(11.8) 
135,045.0 
(100.0) 
1985 77,091.6 
(73.5) 
27,753.9 
(26.5) 
104,845.5 
(100.0) 
1986 79,718.4 
(78.1) 
22,376.0 
(21.9) 
1(^2,094.4 
(100.0) 
Source: Lamberte, Mario B. and Jose, Anita A. "The Manufacturing 
Sector and the Informal Credit Markets: The Case of 
Trade Credits in the Footwear Industry." PIDS Working 
Paper Series NO. 88-07, May 1988. (Table VI.1). 
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for a term of one (1) day to 60 days. It can be surmised from 
the foregoing that the informal urban economy, much like the 
rural economy, is largely a self-financing sector. The segment 
with external finance is largely dependent on informal credit. 
Much of the informal credit is, however, in the nature of 
"extended family equity" in the enterprises. Lending programs 
implemented by the government through the formal financial system 
hardly reached the small and micro enterprises. 
ICMs and the Overseas Employment Sector. Focusing on the 
overseas employment sector, the 1987 survey by Mangahas (1989) 
found a significant participation of the ICMs in the provision of 
credit to overseas workers. The credit market in this sector is 
almost totally informal, half of which is non-commercial from the 
extended family system. 
In nominal terms, the total placement expenses incurred by 
newly hired overseas contract workers from 1980 to 1987 is 
estimated at £14.4 billion. For 1987 alone, total placement 
expenses amounted to £2.9 billion, of which £1.72 billion or 
59.3 percent were financed by ICM sources. The rest (£1.2 
billion) were self-financed or employer sponsored with no 
obligation to repay (Abrera-Mangahas 1989). 
The role of formal credit is very marginal. Credit from 
government lending, mainly from a government social insurance 
agency, is also peripheral comprising only 1.9 percent of all 
funding transactions in overseas employment. At present the lone 
government credit program for overseas workers comes from the 
Welfare Fund (Welfund), which is supervised by the Overseas 
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) of the Department of Labor. 
The Welfund totaling more than £750 million, has been generated 
since 1981 from the required assessment of US$25 to US$50 from 
every departing contract worker. Among several programs and 
projects is a lending program for needy workers and their 
families. The credit program, funded at £15.0 million, is 
designed as assistance for pre-departure expenses, family 
assistance while the worker is abroad, and an educational skills 
upgrading course for seamen. Loans from Welfund are processed 
and released directly to borrowers by the OWWA. However, SWS 
survey results show no awareness of the programs. 
About 60.0 percent of all first-hire contracts reported by 
336 respondents were financed by loans to pay for the recruitment 
costs for processing, placement fees, other charges^ and personal 
expenses.7/ This is a relatively high proportion - — compared 
V Total initial or first-hire contracts is 396. This 
includes first-hire contracts of respondents leaving for the 
first time in 1987 (referred to as "new hires"), and first-hire 
contracts of re-exiting worker-respondents whose initial work 
contracts were negotiated within 1980-1985 ("early hires"). 
34 
to the rest of the sectors we have already covered. An important 
reason for the need of financing is the rising cost of overseas 
placement which has risen from ?2,020 in 1980 to £9,831 in 1987. 
Job prices rose sharply in 1982 and peaked in 1985 at its highest 
level of (£13,002). 
Aside from the traditional family/friends and private 
individual moneylenders, the overseas employment sector developed 
its own specialized segment of the informal credit markets, with 
foreign employers and recruitment agents being the credit sources 
of about one-fourth of the borrowers. These sources provide 
advances to the overseas contract workers, subject to salary 
deductions (Tables 10 and 11). This form of tied credit (tied to 
employment contract) was used in the past mainly for travel 
expenses of workers bound for the United States and Europe. But 
following the rapid rise in recruitment costs, foreign employers 
and recruitment agents entered the informal credit markets more 
significantly starting 1981-82. The simultaneous rise in the 
placement cbsts and tightening of the credit market prompted 
employers and agents in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to 
provide interim financing for both placement and travel expenses 
so that departures for overseas job sites would not be disrupted. 
Employers and agents also found that combining credit 
arrangements with overseas work contract is less costly than 
replacing workers who are unable to find finance for their 
overseas jobs. This avoids more lengthy processing time and at 
the same time helps maintain their reliability as labor 
suppliers. 
Size of the ICM by Economic Status 
By income status, the incidence of informal borrowings is 
highest among the low income population, thus, confirming the 
important role of the ICMs in channeling credit to small and poor 
borrowers, in a survey of families belonging to the bottom 30.0 
percent, some 13.3 percent of the 25.9 million low income 
population were borrowers anytime from 1975 to 1985 (NEDA 
1986); 70.0 percent were getting their loans from the ICMs. 
This high incidence of informal credit among borrowers of 
limited means is also reflected in the 1987 SWS data. Five 
economic classifications can be distinguished from the SWS 
surveys (AB - rich; C - middle class; D - poor; E - poorest). 
Across classification, the ratio of borrower^ to population in 
the class is quite similar (Table 12). However, more of the 
poorest borrowers are ICM clientele (1986 - 75.0 percent; 1987 
77.0 percent). The borrowings of the D and E households are 
about 2.5 times the combined indebtedness of the rich and the 
middle class households indicating in part the more serious cash 
flow problems and credit requirements for meeting household and 
production expenses among the poor and the pobtest. In Table 
13, the data by economic classification is shown in terms of the 
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Table 10: SWS SURVEY OF OVERSEAS WORKERS: 
SOURCES OF FINANCING 
(in Percent) 
Early Hires New Hires 
1980-1985 1987 
Types of Fund Sources 
Employer Sponsorship 24.1 9.8 
Self-Finances 
1. Personal Savings 32.9 48.4 
2. Sale of Assets 1.2 3.2 
Sub-Total 34.1 51.6 
• Borrowings and Advances from: 
1. Family 
(without interest) 42.8 CM i-( •sf 2. Family 
(with interest) 10.3 14.3 
3. Professional 
moneylenders 7.0 8.5 4. Gov't Financial 
Institution 2.5 2.6 5. Pawnshop 0.7 6. Credit from employer 
(advances) 4.1 13.7 7. Agent (advances) 2.0 5.2 8. Airlines (advances) 2.0 
Sub-Total for Borrowings 
and Advances 70.8 84.3 
Source: Mangahas, M. A. "Response to New Market Opportunities: 
The Case of Overseas Employment Sector." Social Weather 
Stations, Inc., August 1989. 
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Table 11: SIZE ESTIMATE OF THE CREDIT MARKET 
FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT, 1987 
Loan 
Source 
% Of 
Trans-
actions 
No. of 
Trans-
actions 
Average 
Size 
(S) 
Fund % 
Volume 
(PM) 
of Total 
Volume 
Formal 
Gov't lending 
Pawnshop 
Credit agency 
3.0 
0.8 
0.8 
8,242 
2,060 
2,060 
1,700 
2,500 
4,000 
14.0 
5.1 
8.2 
0.8 
0.3 
0.5 
Sub-Total 4.6 27.3 1.6 
Informal 
Family Loans 
(interest-free) 47.3 129,806 6,775 879.4 50.2 
Family Loans 
(interest-bearing) 16.5 45,330 4,310 195.4 11.2 
Professional 
Moneylenders 9.8 26,785 6,588 176.4 10.1 
Employers 
(credit advances) 15.8 43,269 9,107 394.0 22.5 
Agents 
(credit advances) 6.0 16,483 4,708 77.6 4.4 
Sub-Total 95.4 1.72 B 98.4 
TOTAL 100.0 1.75 B 100.0 
Source: Mangahas, Ma. Alcestis A. "Response to Ne;w Market 
Opportunities: The Case of Overseas Employment Sector." 
Social Weather Stations, Inc., August 1989. 
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poverty self-rating by respondents, which further confirm the 
pattern of borrowings from and dependence on ICMS in Table 12. 
The results are quite significant, particularly with regard 
to policies on credit subsidies and those that tend to constriet 
the supply of loans in the system. In the past decades, outright 
subsidies on loans to target groups and priority $ectors had been 
liberally provided as part of the government's credit policies. 
While such policies may have been defensible from the point of 
view of encouraging activities in areas designated as government 
priority areas, the benefits of the subsidies were received by 
those who were better off. From the perspective of income 
equity, the poor and the poorest did not benefit because they 
essentially' did not have access to the subsidized funds through 
the financial institutions. The subsidies may haV^e even 
contributed to the widening in the income gap. policy measures 
that attempt at providing credit subsidies even for the low 
income group should therefore be avoided. To them, what i? more 
important is improved access to alternative sources of financial 
services. This can be promoted through more liberal branching 
policies, positive support to the development of credit 
cooperatives and informal grassroots savings and lending clubs. 
Fiscal policies that would improve the infrastructure support in 
the countryside will also enhance profitable economic activities 
for increasing wealth. 
The other implications have to do with policies that affect 
the supply of loans in the system. Measures such as the former 
Anti-Usury law, fixing maximum spreads between the cost of funds 
and lending rates of banks, and making informal lending unlawful 
will tend to reduce the supply and/or make the act of lending 
more risky and, hence, increase the cost of credit to the 
borrowers. Since the majority of the borrowing population, 
especially the low income households, get their loans from the 
ICM, any of the above measures will hurt rather than help them. 
III. SAVINGS, CONSUMPTION CREDIT, ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
INTERACTION WITH FORMAL SECTORS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MONETARY POLlqY AND DEPOSITOR SECURITY 
A. Role of ICMs in Savings Mobilization 
In general, there is a strikingly high degree of reliance by 
informal lenders oh their own savings and earnings from employ-
ment and business for on-lending. Nonetheless, certain segments 
of the ICMs exhibit their effectiveness and potential in 
mobilizing small deposits among low-income earners. 
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The savings mobilization role varies according to the 
segments of the ICMs. Ptofessional moneylenders do not mobilize 
deposits, as a rule. An exception to this rule was, however, 
found in Sapang Palay where one Moneylender plays the role of an 
indigenous banker. She accepts time deposits for as low as £100 
and pays an interest of 80.0 percent per annum. This is an 
opportunity not provided by banks whose minimum time deposit is 
£5,000, an amount much higher than what low-income earners can 
afford. As of the date of interview, this moneylender had 51 
depositors with combined deposits amounting to £40,200, 
comprising about 70.0 percent of her loanable funds. This 
demonstrates the capability of moneylenders to mobilize deposits. 
What seems to be important is that they can fashion out a savings 
instrument that is attractive and affordable to low-income 
groups. 
Deposit-taking function is performed by cooperative credit 
unions (CCUs), "paluwagan," and other unregistered savings and 
lending groups with homogeneous and small membership. These self-
help groups demonstrate their importance as a means of mobilizing 
deposits among low-income earners. They perform a particularly 
significant role in providing services to those who do not have 
access to the credit facilities of the banking system. A 
"paluwagan" is a mutual self-help group wherein a group of 
persons turn in the same amount of money towards a common fund 
and then take turns in using the amount so collected. Usually 
managed by one person, deposits in a "paluwagan" do not earn 
interest, but they serve the purpose of providing each member of 
the group with larger funds when his turn to collect the "sahod" 
(kitty) comes. "Paluwagan" is a significant segment of the 
credit markets in a low income community, such as Sapang Palay, 
as earlier mentioned. 
Savings mobilisation by unregistered savings and credit 
groups are undertaken among their members through schemes that 
encourage members to make small but regular deposits with the 
club. These are self-regulated groups. They are a crossbreed of 
sort between the "paluwagan" and the CCU. Deposits raised by the 
savings groups ate usually used for specific purposes and 
investments, including lending to members.. Some 54 savings clubs 
of agrarian reform farmer-beneficiaries in five municipalities 
are reported in Agabin (1988); the author personally played a 
role in their formation as part of a participatory planning and 
management-oriented project being implemented by the Department 
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Members of low-income households are 
encouraged to form their own group to promote savings, generate 
local resources for the members' use, and address the problem of 
lack of access to bank services. Regular deposit per member of 
these groups range from £2.00-£30.00 per month. These amounts 
are below the minimum amount of savings deposit required by banks 
to open and maintain an account. For many of the members of the 
savings groepSf, putting such small deposits in the bank means 
incurring relatively high transaction costs. 
41 
One such savings group in the agrarian reform settlement 
area of Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte in the southern part of the 
Philippines raised £275.00 deposits initially among 10 families 
only in May 1988. Minimum regular deposit is £10.00 per month 
per member. As of February 1989, membership had grown to 33 and 
total savings rose to £18,158. This means that each member has 
built an average deposit of £550.00. The funds are invested in a 
consumer store from which loans in kind at no interest are 
available to any member up to the amount of his deposit with the 
savings group. Cash loans have been made available to members 
recently at 5.0 percent per month, and to non-members at 10.0 
percent per month. The market rate in the community is between 
15.0 and 20.0 percent per month. The rate of interest on 
deposits is tied to the income from investments, a consumer 
store, which has proven very profitable. This group so far has 
been able to pay up to 20.0 percent monthly interest on deposits 
of members. Through the savings club, the group of non-wealthy 
individuals and households has been provided access to saving 
and loan services. Members have also been able to benefit from 
the high interest income on their deposits. Formation of the 
groups came about after the farmers and" some of their wives 
attended a training seminar on how to form and implement their 
own saving and lending schemes. 
Saving with CCCJs, "paluwagan," and savings clubs entail yery 
low transactions cost because they operate in a limited 
geographic setting, e.g., public markets, offices, or around the 
neighborhood, and cater to fairly homogeneous individuals, e.g., 
market vendors, employees, neighbors. The method of collecting 
deposits is inexpensive, like, hiring collectors in the case of 
market-based CCUs and payroll deduction in the case of 
institution-based CCUs. Regular meetings of the savings clubs 
are used as occasions for getting deposits of members. In 
contrast, the transactions cost for depositing in a bank is 
prohibitively high. Lamberte and Bunda (1988) found that a bank 
depositor living in Sapang Palay spends on the average £13.93 
every time he deposits/withdraws money from a bank. 
One attractive feature of these informal savings 
institutions is reciprocity. Members save with the expectation 
that they can borrow, and they tend to save more if they want to 
borrow more. These savings institutions facilitate saving-
investment decisions of low-income earners, in particular, the 
existence of a variety of "paluwagan" units offers them 
opportunities to save and overcome the problem of 
indivisibilities in investment and consumption in'accordance with 
their financial capacity. Among small savings clubs, the 
regularity required in making deposits instills the habit and 
discipline of thrift. Moreover, the pooling of small savings 
gives the groups the chance to participate in economic 
opportunities which individual resources cannot possibly permit. 
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Savings mobilized by CCUs and "paluwagan" are substantial 
(Table 14). As of the date of the interview, the average fixed 
deposit of the sample CCU members stood at £9,145. This is about 
12 times greater than their average initial fixed deposits. 
Considering that the respondents of the study have been Members 
of their respective credit unions for an average of 8.7 years, it 
means that on the average each member has been increasing his 
fixed deposit by £967.00 per year, in Sapang Palay, "paluwagan" 
members received "sahod" or kitty averaging £26,080 from the 
"paluwagan" for the past two years. These are not insignificant 
amounts of savings mobilized by such institutions. 
The existence of CCUs, "paluwagan," and other savings groups 
has brought about net addition to total financial savings. For 
instance, those who do not have deposits with a bank constitute 
about half of the sample CCU members and 72.0 percent of the 
sample "paluwagan" members. Among the bank depositors, only a 
handful of them were able to borrow from a bank (Tables 15 and 
In the case of the savings group cited earlier, no one has 
any deposit nor borrowings with a bank. The uninvested amount of 
savings mobilized from members is, however, deposited with a 
local rural bank which is the only financial institution in the 
area. This deposit represents additions to the savings mobilized 
by the formal system. 
B. Consumption Credit 
Loans classified as consumption credit in the Central Bank 
Statistical Bulletin comprise a very minor portion <6.0 %) of 
total loans granted by the formal financial system in a typical 
year. For the banking system, the proportion of consumption 
credit to total credit disbursement in 1986 was 3.6 percent. 
Consumption loans from the NBFIs are significant though at 74.0 
percent of loans given in the same year. Taken together, 
however, the formal system plays a marginal role in the provision 
of consumption credit. 
ICMs perform fairly efficient in the Philippines in 
meeting the consumption requirements of borrowers. in general, 
lenders in the ICMs do not restrict the use of loan proceeds. 
This is one of their attractive features. 
Such consumption credit includes those obtained for expenses 
on food, education, medical, other personal and providential 
needs, house repairs, and so on. The significance of consumption 
loans varies according to the type of borrower, that is, based on 
the major source of income. Among rice-based farm households, 
for instance, borrowings for production us« is high. In the rice 
farming sector, it is interesting to note that farmers borrow 
more for production now than they ever did before. During the 
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Table 14: SAVING BEHAVIOR OF CCU MEMBERS 
Fixed Deposits Savings Deposit Time Deposits 
No. Ave. Amt. No. Ave. Amt. 
tfO 
No. Ave. Amt. 
1. CCU 82* 9,144.25 46 13,301.60 
(56.1) 
- -
2. Banks - 45 38,584.10 12 32,287.54 
3. Paluwagan - — — — 22 19,096.26 
*Two respondents did not give the answer. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percent. 
Source: Lamberte, Mario B. and Balbosa, Joven Z. "Informal 
Savings and Credit Institutions in the Urban Areas: The 
Case of Cooperative Credit Unions." PIDS Working Paper 
Series No. 88-06. (Table V.16). 
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Table 15: BORROWING BEHAVIOR OF CCU MEMBERS, 
January - September 1987 
Sources of Credit ( 1 ) No. of 
Respondents 
(2) (3) (4) 
Average Average Average 
Amount Maturity Interest 
Borrowed days 
( ? ) (%) 
y 
1 . CCU 80 21,760. 30 258. 7 19.5 
(97.6) (23,615. 20) (572. 4) (5.8) 
2. Banks 4 12,750. 00 322. 5 19.5 
(4.9) (18,191. 12) (75. 0) (7.33) 
3. Professional . 7 2,785. 70 65. 7 120.0 
Moneylenders ( 8.2) (2,lis. 50) (30. 3) (0.0) 
2/ 3/ 
4. Friends/Neigh- ' 14 10,607. 14 95. 0 6.0 
bors/Relatives (17.0) (10,388. 93) (60. 0) ( - ) 
5/ 6/ 
5. Traders/Suppliers 26 " 4/ 51,613. 46 53. 5 29.3 
(51.0) (121,792. 49) (19. 3) (4.2) 
6. Paluwagan 22 19,096. 26 _ 
(26.8) (41,486. 10) -
i / 
2/ 
3/ 
1/ 
I 
5/ 
I 6/ 
Effective interest rate which is the interest rate 
discounted in advance plus all charges. 
Refers to only 7 respondents. The other 7 respondents have 
loans without maturity. 
Refers to only one respondent. The other 13 respondents were 
not charged interest on their loans. 
Refers to only those wno are engaged in a business. 
t 
Refers to an average amount borrowed per month. 
I 
Price differential between goods bought in cash and on credit. 
This is based on the responses from 15 respondents. 
Note: Figures in parentheses in column (1) are percent, 
wnile in columns (2) - (4) are standard deviations. 
Source: Lamberte, M. B. and Balbosa, J. Z. " Informal Savings 
and Credit Institutions in the Urban Areas: The Case of 
Cooperative Credit Unions." PIDS Working Paper Series 
No. 88-06. (Table V.21). 
I 
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Table 16: ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF LOANS, MATURITY PERIOD AND 
INTEREST RATE 
Source Respondent Average Average Average 
Number % of Total Maturity 
Period 
(Days) 
Interest 
Rate (%/ 
annum)* 
Amount 
Borrowed 
(?) 
Bank 0 0 - - -
Savings 
Association 4 8.9 67.5 66.2 1,137.50 
Moneylenders 9 20.0 76.4 111.11 1,558.89 
Relatives 8 17.8 10.62 0.0 2,525.00 
Traders/ 
Suppliers 24 53.3 12.58 0.0 3,481.67 
Others 
(friends, 
neighbors, 
etc.) 7 15.6 23.43 13.7 12,021.43 
Source: Lamberte, M. B. and Bunda, M.T. "The Financial Markets 
in Low-Income Urban Communities: The Case of Sapang 
Palay." PIDS Working Paper Series No. 88-05. (Table 
V.ll). 
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1950s, loans were obtained primarily for consumption. The 
availability of new farm production technology did affect the 
type of demand for credit (Sacay, Agabin, Tanchoco [1985]). The 
picture is different among coconut-based borrowers, fishing 
households, and landless agricultural workers, where consumption 
loans are more significant. Informal borrowings for operating 
capital are important among market vendors. 
In the rural credit history study by ACES, farm production 
is reported to be the major reason for getting loans by 85.0 
percent of the rice farmer-borrowers and 71.0 percent of the 
rice-onion farmer borrowers. Borrowings by the farmers rise 
during the months for planting, with the peak months in June and 
July, the main crop season for rice. Sub-peaks reflect the 
second season for rice and the planting season for onion. The 
seasonality' of demand for loans by the farm households clearly 
reflect the counter cyclical pattern in the cash flows between 
farmers and traders. On the other hand, non-farm households 
borrow primarily for food consumption - 70.0 percent (ACES 
1988). Twenty-one of the 38 nan-farmer respondents reported 
farm work as their main source of income. The months when 
consumption loans seem acute alio coincide with the planting 
months (June-July, August) as expenses for education and need for 
operating capital to do their £arm jobs compete with their 
available cash balances for basic food requirements. The school 
year in the Philippines opens in June. 
We do not have detailed data to provide analysis on how well 
the informal credit markets meet the requirements arising out of 
crop failures which would necessitate the evening out of 
consumption between crop years. The only indication we nave 
comes from the responses of the rural informal lenders studied by 
ACES. Some 29 of the 46 respondents reported increases in the 
number of borrowers anytime during the period 1972-87. When 
asked why, 13 of the 29 lenders cited typhoons and other natural 
calamities as the reasons. Judging from the purposes of 
borrowing, however, the additional loans could have been used for 
replanting the crop. 
In coconut- and other crop-based areas, informal borrowing 
for consumption purposes alone is predominant. Geron (1988) 
found that 55.6 percent among coconut farmer*, 43.0 percent among 
other crops farmers borrowed from ICMs for consumption purposes. 
Among fishermen, consumption was the reason for 34.4 percent of 
the borrowers but medical and education purposes were also high 
at 31.3 percent. Most of the loans were £1,000.00 or below and 
payable either "when able" and/or "upon harvests" (Table 17). 
These data accent the variations in the primary role being 
performed by various segments of the informal credit markets ahd 
their capacity for accommodating small consumptive and emergency 
loan requirements of rural households under very flexible lending 
terms. 
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Table 17: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FARMER BORROWERS, IV CROP GROWN/ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, BY PURPOSE OF LOAN, BY MATURITY PERIOD, 
EI6HT VILLAGES IN QUEZON, CANARINES NORTE, AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCES, 1987 Survey 
F a r • i n g 
Palay Coconut Palay-Coconut Other Crops Hired Labor Fishing Others 
No. I No. I No. I No X No. Z No. Z No Z 
Purpose of Loan 
Production 212 49.B 17 11.1 65 51.2 5 35.7 4 4.0 4 12.5 - -
Consumption 66 15.2 85 55.6 41 32.3 6 42.9 67 67.7 11 34.4 4 40,0 
Trading - - 1 B.7 2 1.6 - - 7 7.1 - - - -
Fiesta/Special 
Occasion - - - - - - - - - , -
Emergency 
(Medical/School 
expense) 29 6.7 9 5.9 4 3.1 - - 11 11.1 10 31.3 5 50.0 
Production/ 
Consumption 126 29.1 41 26.B 15 11.8 3 21.4 10 10.1 7 21.9 1 10.0 
TOTAL 433 1BB.B 153 1B0.B 127 100.0 14 100.0 99 100.0 32 100.0 10 100.0 
Maturity Period 
less than 1 month 4 9.9 4 2.6 4 3.1 1 7.1 4 4.0 3 9.4 - -
1-3 months 13 3.8 11 7.2 15 11.7 1 7.1 5.1 - - - -
4-6 months 274 63.3 4 2.6 22 17.2 30 30i 3 - - 5 50.0 
7-12 months 4 fl.9 1 0.7 - - - - - ^ 2 6.3 -
1 to 2 years - - 1 B.7 - - - - 1 1.0 1 3.1 - -
3 years t above - - • - - - - - - - - -
payable nhen able 91 21.fl 54 35.3 65 50.8 11 78.6 57 57.6 23 71.9 5 50.0 
payable upon 
harvest 46 IB.6 78 51. B 22 17.2 1 7.1 2 2.0 3 9.4 
— 
TOTAL 432 99.8 153 100.0 128 100.0 14 100.0 99 100.0 32 100.0 10 100.0 
Source: Geron, Na. Piedad. "Philippine Informal Rural Credit Markets: Efficiency and Equity Issues." 
1988. (Table 2). 
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Table 18 shows how borrowers allocated the loans obtained 
from CCUs and "paluwagan." The kinds of members of these savings 
and credit institutions determine to a large extent the uses of 
the loans. It should be noted that most members of the sample 
CCUs and "paluwagan" are market vendors. Thus, a great 
proportion Of the loan proceeds was used for productive purposes. 
The relatively short maturity period of these loans prompted 
borrowers to use them for augmenting their working capital. It 
is to be noted, however*, that a significant proportion of the 
loan proceeds was used for other purposes, suph as family 
consumption, house repairs/improvement, acquisition of household 
appliances, education, etc. Productive consumption seems to be 
one of the important uses of loans. 
C. The Efficiency Impact of ICMs 
So far, it has been shown that (i) borrowers who participate 
in the ICMs compose the majority; (ii) the incidence of informal 
borrowing s is highest among the poor; (iii) the ICMs have a large 
part in financing the credit obtained by small and micro 
enterprises especially in the informal sector; and (iv) that a 
large portion of the loans in ICMs is used for productive 
investments. It can also be argued here that loans for food and 
other consumption needs basic to keeping body and soul together 
are also in the nature of "productive" investments as they enable 
the borrower and members of his household to continue to do their 
income-earning jobs. 
From the above, it is clear that the I?Ms have been an 
important channel of financial services to individuals and 
enterprises which cannot be serviced by the formal -Credit 
markets. Hence, ICMs have helped address the problem of formal 
credit allocation imbalances. Such imbalances are engendered by 
the policies and preferences of the banking system as well as 
the high transaction costs inherent in small loans from banks. 
To the extent that informal lenders have loans from the 
formal sources, these informal lenders have provided a network 
through which the financial resources of the formal system could 
be channeled to small borrowers. 
By and large, segmentation seems to be more pronounced ih 
the ICMs than in the formal credit markets. For instance, CCUs, 
"paluwagan," and small savings clubs tend to operate in areas 
where members are fairly homogeneous, like, all are market 
vendors in the same locality, employees of the same firm, or 
residents in the same neighborhood. Loans are given only to 
members. Thfe^e are, however, features essential to the 
successful implementation and management of such saving and 
lending groups. >qput suppliers do the same. They grant trade 
and cash credits only to manufacturers directly buying raw 
materials from them. Trader-lenders also tend to narrow their 
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Table 18: USES OF LOAM PROCEEDS, URBAN ICM 
(In Percent) 
Uses CCU Paluwagan 
Business 60.0 49.2 
Household appliances/furniture 5.8 3.2 
House repairs/improvements 1.9 10.2. 
Family consumption 6.4 9.6 
Payment of loans 3.7 12.3 
Loans to others 1.7 2.4 
Savings 0.9 7.8 
Education 8.1 0.5 
Medical care 2.5 -
House/lot acquisition 1.2 - . 
Application for overseas job - 1.1 
Jewelries 0.1 -
Others 7.7 3.8 
Sources: Lamberte & Bunda, 1988. (Taole V.8); Lamberte & 
Balbosa, 1988. (Table V.13). 
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lending to clients whose product is tied to the lender's 
participation in the product market. About 75.0 percent of the 
125 informal lenders in Geron (1988) stated that they extend 
loans to assure the purchase of the farmers' outputs; some three-
fourths (or 89) of the lenders are engaged in trading. Even 
moneylenders tend to narrow down their lending to "suki" or prime 
clients. Although this puts into question the allocative 
functions of the ICM, the narrow circle of clientele enhances 
operational efficiency, provides for better assessment of credit 
risks and collection, and lessens the cost associated with 
information gathering and administration costs. 
D. The Equity Impact of ICMs 
We have earlier shown that the incidence of borrowings by 
the population who are "not poor" or "on the line" is only 
slightly higher than the incidence of borrowings by those who 
rated themselves poor (see Table 13). In short, across income 
groups informal borrowing is significant, comprising half or more 
than half of total borrowings. But among those belonging to the 
poverty group, informal loans compose a much more substantial 
portion. similarly, pieces of empirical evidence suggest that 
petty traders, artisans, small farmers, rural and urban overseas 
contract workers, service operators, market vendors, and other 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector rely greatly on informal 
sources for credit to augment their short term operating capital. 
Thus, the sectors not reached by banks are served by the ICMs. 
To many of them, the informal source is the only source 
available. 
The issue on equity is usually associated with the price of 
informal loans, the usual notion being that it is extortionary. 
There is actually a wide variation in the interest rates on ICM 
loans. There are segments with very high rates of interests 
relative to the formal bank rates. The existence Of high rates 
of interest reflect a situation of excess demand as well as 
imperfections not only in the credit markets but in the other 
markets as well. Where the incidence of very high rates fall on 
borrowers with more limited means, surplus extraction may be 
taking place. Unfortunately, data available to us do not permit 
us to analyze interest rates in this respect. 
One segment which charges relatively lower rates is the 
credit cooperative sector where the financial intermediation 
functions are performed as a service to members. Nevertheless, 
certain internal policy practices of credit unions have some 
equity impact on members of the CCU. For instance, in Lamberte 
and Balbosa (1988), one credit union was found charging 25.2 
percent per annum for loans up to £500.00 with a maturity period 
of five (5) months while it charges only 13.0 percent per annum 
for loans above £1,000.00 with a maturity period of 12 months. 
With the loan capacity formula credit unions are using, big 
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depositors can borrow several times larger than small depositors. 
This is aggravated by the fact that the effective interest rate 
id not adjusted according to risk. 
Likewise, input suppliers tend to charge higher effective 
interest rate on trade credits to small footwear manufacturers 
than to big footwear manufacturers. Swaminathan (1982) found a 
parallel situation in farm credit in Nueva Ecija where the value 
ofe assets owned by the borrower affects the interest charged on 
farm loans in crop year 1980-81. Between the small farms and 
large ones the difference was 7.2 percentage points per month. 
In another case, Abrera-Mangahas (1989) found that lenders 
with a large share (at least 75.0 percent) of overseas 
employment loans carry smaller-sized loans with lower interest 
rates and shorter maturity period. Being familiar with the 
overseas employment market, their subjective evaluation of risk 
is low, hence they also charge lower rates. In contrast, large 
lenders whose overseas employment loans are a minor portion of 
total lending offer larger loans with high interest rates, longer 
maturity period, and fewer installment payments. These are large 
lenders tapped by borrowers who want larger loan size. The 
larger loan size, longer maturity period and the unfamiliarity 
with the overseas employment market could be the reason why 
interest rate charged by these lenders are high compared to those 
lenders with a large share of overseas employment loans. A two-
tiered pricing policy has been followed by two respondent-lenders 
since 1985: one lender charges five percent per month on loans 
below £5,000, and 10 percent on loans over £5,000; the other 
lender collects five percent per month on loans below £3,000 and 
10 percent on loans above £3,000. 
In her work with rural savings groups, Agabin observes that 
loans given to members usually carry rates lower than the 
prevailing commercial informal rates in their communities. For 
example, the savings group in Sto. Tomas, Davao cited earlier is 
charging a monthly rate that is 10.0 to 15.0 percentage points 
lower than the rates of other informal sources in the community. 
The foregoing shows the wide mix of situations and practices 
in the ICMs that may or may not have impact on social equity. 
E. Interaction with Formal Sectors 
Whether the formal and informal sectors are substitutes or 
complementary to each other is an important issue that must be 
dealt with. Unfortunately, the nature of the data of the various 
studies do not permit us to construct a model to test such 
hypothesis. Only indicative results can therefore be presented 
from various studies. 
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One indicator of the substitutability of both sectors is 
that one expands at the expense of the other. In this regard we 
examine the behavior through time of borrowers and lenders in the 
six (6) rural villages studied by ACES and some segments of the 
urban ICMs. The credit history of the rural borrowers and 
lenders was traced by the researchers from 1972 to the time of 
interview in August 1987. Borrower-respondents are those who 
borrowed anytime within the period, while lender-respondents are 
those who actively provided loans also anytime between 1972 and 
1987. In examining the data it should be recalled that the 
largest credit program offered for the rural areas with a low 
interest rate of 10.0 to 12.0 percent was started in 1973, peaked 
in 1974 and 1975 and thereafter continuously declined with rising 
default. Moreover, recall that the Philippines suffered the 
worst economic crisis during the period 1984-1986. 
As may be seen in Table 19, the number of rural borrowers 
from the informal markets declined during 1973 and 1974, with 
many borrowers stating attraction to low interest rate as a 
motivation for borrowing from source. For instance, among rice 
farmers, 37 of the 77 who borrowed during 1974 Obtained their 
loans from formal sources. Thereafter, formal borrowings 
declined substantially such that by 1986 only eight (8) of the 64 
rice-farm household borrowers got their loans from the formal 
system. 
On the other hand, the ACES historical data on ICM lenders 
show that the nominal value of loans granted by the informal 
lenders continue to rise except in 1974 when both nominal and 
real values declined (See Table 20). The government credit 
program appeared to be merely a temporary aberration to their 
lending activities. Indeed, only five of the 46 selected 
informal lenders stated that they ever experienced reduction in 
their lending activities due to the implementation of government 
credit programs in the rural areas. The lower real values 
obtained from 1979 onwards are on account of the double digit 
inflation rates. The effects of the crisis period are shown in 
the data to have eroded the real participation of ICMs in terms 
of the value of loans granted. Significant increases in capital 
and loan volume were, however, registered by 1986. None of the 
46 lender- respondents reported having obtained any bank loan. 
Some 31 lenders reported farming as their major source of income, 
eight (8) were in palay/onion trading, and five (5) were 
professional moneylenders. 
In Table 21, the real assets of both the sample CCUS and the 
banking system had been growing before 1984. However, during the 
crisis period, the real assets of the banking system had been 
shrinking while those of the sample CCUs had continued to 
increase. Pawnshops, which are one of the least regulated among 
the formal financial institutions, follow the same growth pattern 
as that of CCUs. The same can be said of trade credits. As 
shown in Table 9, both bank loans and trade credits grew in 
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absolute terms before 1984. During the economic crisis, both 
types of credit dropped sharply. However, trade credits 
recovered fast and even increased their size relative to bank 
loans, implying that the manufacturing sector increased its 
dependence on trade credits when bank loans became more scarce. 
Viewed from the macro perspective, results seem to suggest 
that during normal times, both the formal and informal are 
complementary, while during abnormal times, both become 
substitutes to each other. This general observation should, 
however, be qualified by taking into consideration the survey 
results. As already pointed out, financial markets in LDCs are 
severely fragmented. One cannot easily move from one maricet to 
the other. Thus, for low-income individuals who do not have 
access to bank credit, the question of substitutability between 
formal and informal credit markets is irrelevant. As can be 
gathered from survey results, only a handful had access to bank 
credit. However, among segments of the ICMs, some element of 
substitutability seems to exist. For instance, CCUS and 
"paluwagan" were organized partly to free members from money 
lenders. Thus, only very few CCU and "paluwagan" members 
borrowed from moneylenders. In Sapang Palay, Lamberte and Bunda 
(1988) found one moneylender who organized two "paluwagan" units; 
but even this moneylender does not lend to the members of her 
"paluwagan." Also, the availability of trade credits has 
somewhat reduced the demand for cash credit from moneylenders. 
The strength of linkage between the formal and informal 
sectors seems to vary with the segment o£ the ICMs. On the 
supply of funds side, bankers report cases of bank loans to 
traders and poultry integrators which are used tb finance 
advances to farmers. In the poultry industry the; advaries are in 
the form of biologies, feeds, and chicks to contract growers 
(Agabin 1988). The contract growers are Usually entrepreneurs/ 
farmers who have the means to put up the < fixed capital for 
poultry housing and the operating capital for labor and 
maintenance during the growing period. 
Similarly, Geron (1988) reports that 76.of the 125 rural 
informal lenders she investigated borrow from banks to augment 
their operating capital requirements fox their businesses, which 
are mostly trading. Unfortunately, the data available- to us do 
not give a breakdown of the sources and uses of funds of the 
informal lenders. An earlier study of rural- ICMs in 1978 
decomposed the sources and uses of funds of 163 lenders (TBAC 
1981). This study found that while a high proportion (88.4 
percent) of their total funds came from own stagings and earnings, 
around 9.0 percent of the amount were borrowed from banks. Some 
10.0 percent of the total funds were on-lent; 87.0 percent were 
used for business expenses, e.g., purchases of merchandise, 
inputs, and produce. 
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Weak linkage between formal and informal sector is, however, 
observed in the operation of CCUs, "paluwagan,u and individual 
lenders. Only four (4) of the 27 informal lenders investigated 
by Lava (1988), borrow from banks for on-lending^. All of the 12 
informal sources lending to overseas workers in Mangahas (1989) 
have no bank borrowings. None of the urb$n moneylenders 
interviewed in Sapang Palay ever borrowed from a bank to finance 
their lending operations. This is also the c^se with the 46 
lenders operating in six (6) rural villages of Nueva Ecija. 
The reliance on internal resources limits the size and scope of 
their lending operations. 
Similarly, not one of the sample CCUs ever.borrowed from a 
bank. From Central Bank data, bank loans to cooperatives sector 
in general do not even reacn one-third of 1.0 percent. In 1986, 
the loans outstanding to the cooperative sector by commercial 
banks amounted to £187.6 million out of the total loans 
outstanding of £90.2 billion at the end of the; year. Banks, 
however, serve as depository of CCU funds. In 1986, deposit with 
banks of sample CCUs comprised 6.0 percent of their total assets. 
As net depositors with the formal financial system, CCUs, in 
effect, serve as feeder network for the banks in savings 
mobilization. Through the funds transfer mechanism, .banks are 
able to search for more profitable investment areas for deposits 
generated. Branches of commercial banks in the rural areas 
evidently transmit funds to the head office in Manila or other 
urban centers in search of higher yielding investment areas. In 
such a situation, CCU funds, which are raised at low transaction 
cost become accessible to a wider number of borrowers with 
relatively high productive need for funds. ? 
It is ironic, however, that the CCUs do not,s^em to enjoy 
reciprocity from the banks. Segments of the CCUs do suffer from 
lack of funds. A number of regional and national federation of 
credit cooperatives and other types of cooperatives have started 
their own interlending mechanism. This is essentially a fund 
transfer mechanism through which excess funds of member 
cooperatives may be mobilized to answer the liquidity needs of 
other member cooperatives. This development marks $ change in 
the level of segmentation within the credit cooperative sector, 
at least on the supply of funds side. 
Input suppliers in the footwear industry also have very 
limited contact with banks as sources of additional;;, funds. Only 
two of the nine sample input suppliers borrowed money from the 
bank in 1987. One of them.obtained a long-term loan to finance 
the acquisition of fixed assets while the other secured a short*-
terra loan to augment his working capital. Only the flatter seems 
to be able to link the formal credit market witeh the informal 
credit market. The reasqn why the majority did-noteborrowfrom 
bank is that they have access to trade credits. In fact, all of 
the sample input suppliers availed of trade credits from 
manufacturers of raw materials. 
58 
Depositor security seems to be less of a concern to the 
participants in the ICM&. As in banking, tru£t is an operative 
norm being observed by participants in the deposit side of 
informal intermediation. In the past few years, a number of 
banks collapsed. Newspapers then were full of stories about the 
predicament of depositors who tried to claim their deposits from 
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). In 
contrast, none of the Sample CCUs experienced a run on deposits. 
It is interesting to note in Table 14 that about half of the 
sample CCU members have larger savings and time deposits with 
banks. while all have fixed deposits with the CCU representing 
their share capital, only half has savings deposit with the CCU. 
The average amount of deposit With CCU is only about a third of 
the bank deposit. This may have something to do with depositor 
security, since deposits with the CCUs do not have any deposit 
insurance coverage. 
The case study on "paluwagah" shed some light on the safety 
of deposits of members. Two managers claimed that a member 
defaulted after receiving the kitty. To prevent the kitty from 
decreasing in the succeeding turns, the managers assumed the 
defaultee's liabilities. This gesture is essential in ensuring 
the manager's credibility and the security of the contributions 
of the members. The presence of core memberis, i.e., those who 
have been ibembers of the Same "paluwagan" units, also gives some 
semblance of stability to the "paluwagan.M 
IV. INTEREST RATES FORMATION AMD TRENDS, COMPETITION BETWEEN 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS, ICMS AS SOURCE OF INNOVATIONS, 
INTERLINKAGE OF CREDIT WITH TRANSACTIONS IN OTHER MARKETS, 
AND PROMOTING LINKAGES WITH THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
A. Interest Rate- Formation and Trends 
There is great hetferogeheity among informal lenders when it 
comes to interest rate determination. Various segments of the 
ICMs have their own way of determining the interest rate on 
savings deposits and loans. -Th^dredit cooperative unions which 
! are the most organized among segments of the ICMs claimed to have 
based their interest rate on savings deposits on the prevailing 
bank rates. During the period 1982-1986, the average interest 
rate on savings deposits of CCUS Was consistently lower by about 
1.0 percentage point than the average de&odit rate given by banks 
(see Table 22). Lambeifte observes that savings deposit rates of 
both the CCUs and banks seem to be insensitive to inflation rate. 
Except for 1986 when the inflation rate dropped to less than 1.0 
percent, savers have been penalised by both CCtte and batiks. 
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Table 22: TRENDS IN THE INTEREST RATES ON SAVINGS1 DEPOSITS 
(Percent Per Annum) 
Year 
CCUs 
Nominal Real 
Banks 
Nominal Real 
1982 8.6 -1.6 9.8 -0.4 
1983 8.6 -1.3 9.7 -0.3 
1984 8.7 -41.6 9.9 -40.5 
1985 8.6 -14.5 10.8 -12.3 
1986 8.0 7.2 8.6 7.8 
Source: Lamberte and Balbosa. "Informal Savings and Credit 
Institutions in the Urban Areas: The Case of 
Cooperative Credit Unions," 1988^ (Table IV.1). 
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in Sapang Palay where no financial institutions operate, the 
moneylender who mobilizes deposits pays the rate of 80.0 percent 
per annum for deposits in 1987. This seems to reflect the 
opportunity cost of capital and also higher than the inflation 
rate (3.8 percent) for that year. The small savings group in 
Sto. Tomas, Davao is another case in point. It is able to pay a 
high rate of 20.0 percent per month (or 240.0 percent per annum). 
The marke* rate on informal loans in the community is between 
15.0 percent and 20,0 percent per month. It is able to pay a 
high rate on deposit since this is linked with the profitability 
of the business (presently, a consumer store) which the savings 
group capitalizes and operates. 
One of the stereotypes about informal lenders is that they 
generally charge very high interest rates. It is more accurate 
to say, however, that there is a very broad range of interest 
rates in the ICMs. At the lower end of the pole, one finds 
"social*1 loans with zero or low rates; there are also rates which 
parallel those of the formal loans; and at the upper end, one 
encounters interest charges which exceed 200.0 percent per annum. 
Lending rates in the ICMs vary according to type and size of 
loans, maturity period, repayment scheme, type of lenders, and to 
the degree of monopoly power being exercised by lenders. Even 
among the same type of lenders variations in lending rates can be 
great. Within the same community wide variations in rates also 
exist. We will leave out the "interest-free, no strings 
attached" social loans. There are many cases of this observed 
both in the earlier literature and in the small-scale surveys 
done by SWS and other researchers for the ICM research project. 
The determination of the lending rates among the rural ICM 
lenders in the six-village case history seems to hinge more on 
their assessment of risks. About two-thirds of the 46 informal 
lenders cited risk-related factors (default, delays in repayment, 
lack of collateral and formal contract) why they charge "high" 
interest rates. Only six (6) of the informal lenders claimed 
they based their rates on the prevailing lending rates in the 
locality. In Table 23, nominal rates given by borrower 
respondents and informal lenders are shown to vary greatly among 
different types of borrowers. Rates reported by rice farmers 
have generally exceeded 100.0 percent per annum in the period 
1972-1987, with rates over 200.0 percent since 1984. In 
contrast, lower rates were reported by the rice-onion farmers. 
Except for 1980 and 1981, rates appear under 90.0 percent per 
annum. The differential rates may be due to the fact that the 
rice farmers obtained higher number of non-cash loans from 
moneylenders and repaid them in non-cash basis compared to onion 
farmers. The imputed interest rate for non-cash loans seems to 
be higher than the rate on cash loans. Storage and marketing 
costs which moneylenders are going to incur for receiving non-
cash payment for loan may have been incorporated in the interest 
rate they charge. 
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The sample rural informal lenders report nominal rates which 
are much lower than those reported by the rice farmers. What is 
interesting, however, is that the nominal rates claimed by the 
lenders showed relative stability during the period of active 
lending by the Masagana 99 and GSK credit pro^r^ms of government 
from 1973 to 1976; thereafter the nominal interest rate rose 
steadily and steeply. The average rate reached very high 
levels during the 1983-84 economic crisis period and kept on 
rising even after. For the 1987 loans, the rate averages 171.0 
percent per year. It should be recalled that during this year, 
the SWS data presented in Section I show a significant increase 
in rural borrowings and informal credit. The continuing rise in 
interest rate after the liberalization of interest rate may be 
reflective of the failure to encourage more competition and 
increasing the flow of bank resources to the rural areas. It 
should be noted, however, that general economic and political 
instability prevailed during the period 1983 to 1987. 
With the high rates of interest, informal lenders have been 
able to enjoy positive real rates (See Table 24). On the other 
hand, real rates of interest of a community rural bank which 
services the villages in the study were negative for some years. 
This bank has been able to adjust its interest rates upward after 
the interest rates liberalization in 1981. 
Table 25 pulls together the findings of other studies on 
rural ICM interest rates showing variations in interest rates by 
value of assets owned by borrower, by level of development of the 
area, and by linkage of the credit market with the other market 
in which the lender/borrower participates. By size of 
farmholding in Nueva Ecija, large farms enjoy a "prime client'' 
status as reported by Swaminathan (1982). By level of 
development, the study of rice farming communities by Floro 
(1986) found lower average rates in the developed areas (Aore 
commercialized, more productive, more capital-intensive) than in 
the marginal ones. The margin of difference is 4.8 percent per 
month on unlinked loans, and 1.2 percent per month on linked 
loans. Average rate on linked loans in undeveloped area is, 
however, reported lower than unlinked loans. Linkage in this 
instance does not imply that the lender necessarily controls or 
exploits the borrower. The linkage is similar to the 
relationship of interest rates of collateralized and 
uncollateralized loans. The linkage helps to guarantee the loan 
repayment. 
On the other hand, Geron's study of eight (8) rice-based 
and coconut-based barangays found higher average rate in 
developed barangays than those classified as undeveloped (See 
Table 26). The rate represents all loans including non-interest 
bearing ones. The study reported that more lenders operate in 
areas classified as "developed" than in areas considered 
"undeveloped." Her finding on level of interest rate seems to 
suggest that the existence of more lenders in the developed areas 
Table 24: REAL INTEREST RATES PER ANNUM, AS REPORTED BY 
SIX NUEVA ECIJA VILLAGES, 1972-86 
Rice R-Onion Non- Informal 
Year Farmers Farmers Farmers Lenders Banks 
1972 108.77 78.77 104.77 33.77 
1973 97.50 16.50 97.50 25.50 -4.50 
1974 85.84 -4.16 86.84 10.84 -22.16 
1975 137.22 29.22 118.22 38.22 5.22 
1976 134.77 32.77 124.77 35.77 2.77 
1977 158.07 23.07 98.07 47.07 2.07 
1978 142.71 49.71 104.71 61.71 4.71 
1979 184.49 28.49 86.49 61.49 -4.51 
1980 159.40 73.40 88.40 72.40 -5.60 
1981 197.61 92.61 109.61 83.61 -0.39 
1982 169.79 43.79 116.79 88.79 1.79-15.79 
1983 187.83 43.83 119.83 97.83 21.83 
1984 186.65 12.65 77.65 78.65 -18.35 
1985 267.90 30.90 68.90 123.90 8.90 
1986 293.23 66.23 87.23 149.23 31.23 
Source: ACES Foundation, Inc. "The Informal Credit 
Market of Six Selected Barangays in Nueva 
Ecija (1972-1987)." August 1988. 
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Table 25: AVERAGE AiMUAL INTEREST HATE ON RORAL AMD INFORMAL LOANS, 
VARIOUS 'STUDIES AND YEARS 
INTEREST RATE (% p.a.) 
PERIOD AUTHOH/AGQCY SURVEY AREAS A. Including zero B. Excluding zero 
COV&ED interest loans interest loans 
1957-58 Gapud Nueva Ecija 98.0 a/ 126.8 a/ 1957-58 Sacay 18 provinces 82.0 V 1978-79 TBAC Bulacan 32.6 a/ 57.7 W C&marines Sur 50.7 V 80.5 b/ Isabela 83.3 a/ 87.7 V 1980-81 Sweminathan Nueva Ecija c/ small farm 
medium farm 91.2 104.4 <V d/ large farm 67.2 <V .1981-82 TBAC Nationwide 48.2 a/ 76.1 a/ 1983-84 e/ Floro Cagayan, Noeva 
Ecija, Iloilo 
Marginal area f/ 
unlinked loans 230.4 <3/ linked loans 212.4 <3/ Developed area f/ 
unlinked loans 172.8 9/ linked loans 198.0 g/ 1987 Geron Quezon, Camarines 
Norte, Nuieva Ecija 
Developed bgys. 
Less Dev. bgys. 75.3 32.9 a/ a/ 
a/ Interest rates on fully paid loans. 
b/ Including traditional credit only, in contrast to figures on left which include 
traditional loans, "legal" type of informal credit and non-conmercial loans, 
c/ The study was conducted in two areas, the control and the ACES areas. Interest 
rates confuted for this table came from the control area only, 
d/ Loan rates are for the wet season only, based on monthly rates of 7.6, 8.7 and 
5.6 percent for-the respective farm sizes, 
e/ Wet season only. 
f/ The researcher classified the 14 sample villages into two groves. The developed area is more productive, capital-intensive, and canonercial marginal area. 
3/ Based frcro monthly rates of 19.2, 17.7, 14.4, and 16.5" 
SOURCES: 1. Floro, Sagrario. "Market Interlinkage in Hiilippine Agriculture." Ph.D. 
dissertation, Stanford University, 1986. 
2. Gapud, Jose P. "Financing Lowland Rice Farming in Selected Barrios in Munoz, 
Nueva Ecija, 1957-58." Unpublished B.S. thesis, University of the 
Philippines at Los Banos, 1958. 
3. Geron, Ma. Piedad. "Philippine Informal Rural Credit Markets: Efficiency 
and Equity Issues." Paper presented at Workshop, UP Los Banos, March 29, 1988. 
4. Sacay, Orlando J. "An Analysis of the Crop Loan Program of the Agricultural 
Credit and Cooperative Financing ftSninistration." unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Cornell University, September 1961, 
5. Swaminathan, Madhura. "The Study on the Credit Behavior of Farm Eanilies in 
Nueva Ecija.", IRRI Ag. Econ. paper No. 82-27. 
6. TBAC. A Study on the Informal Rural Financial Markets in Three Selected 
Provinces of the Philippines. Manila, 1981. 
7. TBAC. "Small Farm Indebtedness, 1981-82." Draft Report. Manila, February 1984. 
a/ 
Table 26: COMPARISON OF ANNUAL INTEREST RATES, BY TYPE 
OF BORROWER, IN EIGHT VILLAGES IN THE PROVINCES 
OF QUEZON, CAMARINES NORTE, AND NUEVA ECIJA, 
1987 
(in Percent) 
Ex-Ante Ex-Popt 
Average No. of Average Ho. of 
Rate Loans Rate Lpans 
Loan 1 
Farming 
Palay 71. 97 316 87.50 267 
Coconut 60. 04 140 53.85 112 
Palay-Coconut 2. 41 95 5.50 85 
Other Crops 3. 94 14 4.20 13 
Fishing 2. 06 32 2.79 18 
Landless Labor 22. 88 80 26.58 69 
Non-Farm Related 53. 65 10 60.72 9 
ALL BORROWERS 38. 29 687 56.30 573 
• : n'l • i» 
a/ Rates on loan no. 1 only. 
Source: Geron, Ma. Piedad. "Philippine Informal Rural 
Credit Markets: Efficiency and Equity Issues." 
1988. (Table 16). 
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does not necessarily mean lower pricing on loans. The researcher 
concluded that the competition;among lenders dO£s not necessarily 
happen in terms of loan pricing but in terms of services 
rendered, such as ttiCre timely and doorstep delivery of loans, 
accommodations in terms of bigger loans and form of loans desired 
by the borrower, and provision bf other services like transport/ 
pick up of farmer's produce or repayment. When taken together 
with borrowing costs,the additional/better services may have the 
effect of lowering overall costs to the farmer. This is merely a 
deduction though. What would seem to account for the lower 
average rate is the much larger portion of zero-rate loans 
obtained by borrowers in the undeveloped barangays. What would 
be interesting to see in future research on ICMs is a full 
accounting of the costs incurred by the lender in rendering the 
other services to the borrower which are clearly connected with 
the loan transactions. 
The wide variances in informal rates are also shown in 
commercial (interest-bearing) loans to overseas contract workers. 
The data in Table 27 shows highest average rate on loans from 
moneylenders. 
In the case of CCUs, the determination of the -effective 
lending rates is somewhat complicated. Interest rate payments 
are Collected in advance and additional charges (i.e., service 
fee, loan redemption insurance, collection charges) are being 
imposed. All these have the effect of raising the effective 
interest rate. Table 28 shows that the nominal rate, which is 
known to members is only half of the effective interest rate, the 
other half being accounted for by the advanced payment on 
interest and other charges. The average effective lending rate 
of CCU approximates the lending rate of banks. 
Lending rates' across CCUs operating in Metro Manila vary 
greatly. Even CC0S belonging to the same federation have 
different rates. This is because members of the federation 
operate independently as units with self-governing policies. The 
variation in lending rate seems mainly due to the differences in 
the nominal rates and service charges. 
Variation in the lending rates cannot be completely 
attributed to the geographic location of the credit markets. In 
the small urban community of Sapang Palay, the researchers found 
substantial interest rate differential among moneylenders for 
loans of the Same maturity (See Table 29). Moneylenders claim 
they do not bother to check the interest rate charged by other 
moneylenders since they find this exercise futile in view of the 
excess demand for credit in that community. 
The various case studies of urban informal lenders by 
Lamberte provide detailed examination of the components of the 
lending rates. 
I 
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lable 27 ANNUAL INTEREST RATES CHARGED ON LOANS OF OVERSEAS 
CONTRACT WORKERS FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES, 1987 
(in Percent) 
Sources Early Hired Newly i 
Informal 
F/F, with interest 47 106 
Prof Money Lenders 130 132 
Emp/Agent Advances 68 45 
Airlines 10 
Sub-Total 78 104 
Formal 
Gov't Fin Inst / 
Rural Banks 
Pawnshop/Prlvate Credit 
Sub-Total 
21 7 
96 
21 37 
Total 73 98 
Percentage with 
cash interest 75 59 
Percentage with 
unknown interest 25 33 
Source Mangahas, M A "Response to New Market Opportunities 
The Case of the Overseas Employment Sector," Social 
Weather Stations, Inc , August 1989 
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Table 28: LENDING RATES OF COOPERATIVE CREDIT ONIONS, 1986 
(in Percent) 
CCUs NR NRC NER 
1. BVDCI 6.5 11.9 13.5 
2. PSPDCI 7.0 18.7 23.0 
3. CMDCI 6.5 17.3 20.9 
4. DTDCI 10.8 21.6 27.6 
5. MCMCCI 7.9 22.3 28.7 
6. MVDCI 6.5 20.9 26.4 
7. UPCCI 10.0 12.2 13.8 
8. FEUCCI 9.0 13.0 14.9 
9. DSE (CBP)KBCI 9,0 10.0 11.1 
10. PECCI 12.0 14.0 16.3 
Average 8*5 16.2 19.6 
Source: Lamberte and Balbosa. "Informal Savings and Credit 
Institutions in the Urban Areas: The Case of 
Cooperative Credit Unions." 1988. (Table IV.2). 
Note: NR = nominal lending rdte 
NRC = nominal lending rate plus other charges 
NER = nominal effective lending rate discounted in 
advance 
Table 29: INTEREST RATE CHARGED PER ANNUM BY MATURITY, SIZE, AND 
TYPE OF BORROWER, SAPANG PALAY MONEYLENDERS 
(In Percent) 
Moneylenders 
A B C D E F G 
A. By Maturity 
(1) 1 - 7 days - - 91 - - 120 -
(2) 15 days - - - - - - -
(3) 30 days - - 195 224 - 120 -
(4) 45 days 97 _ 195 - - - 96 
(5) 60 days 70 97 - 137 - - -
(6) 90 days - 193 - - 175 120 97 
B. By Size 
(1) small 
(less than 
P2,000) 
same 
for 
all 
97 same 
for 
all 
same 
for 
all 
same 
for 
all 
60 same 
for 
all 
(2) large 
(P2,000 
and more) 
— 193 — — — 120 — 
C. By type of borrower 
(1) new 120 same 
for 
all 
same 
for 
all 
190 same 
for 
all 
same 
for 
all 
same 
for 
all 
(2) old 84 - - 140 - - -
Source: Lamberte, M. and Bunda, M.T. "The Financial Markets in 
Low-Income Communities: The Case of Sapang Palay." 1988. 
(Table IV.7). 
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Table 30 shows the components of lending rates of 
moneylenders in Sapang Palay. The results are mixed. Despite 
very high rates, one moneylender realized a net spread of only 
1.5 percent, while two (2) new entrants in the credit market 
incurred a loss. The loss of these new moneylenders could be 
considered part of the sunk costs of establishing their business. 
The rest of the moneylenders enjoyed hefty profit margins. 
Moneylenders D and E have the biggest number of clients and 
realized the largest profit spread. There is wide dispersion of 
lending rates among moneylenders. It is also ob&ervfed thsit 
borrowers lack the ability to transfer to moneylenders who charge 
relatively lower lending rates. These are indications of a 
severely fragmented capital markets prevailing even in a small 
urban community. 
The case of trade credit is something else. The effective 
interest rate on tradte credit is fouhd to consist of the explicit 
and implicit rates. The explicit rate can be further broken down 
into the discount rate on post-dated checks and plain interest 
rate. The implicit rate arises out of price differential of 
inputs or of outputs in the case of "tied" credit arrangement. 
The results of estimating the effective interest rate on trade 
credits and their components are in Table 31. The bulk of the 
components of effective interest rate consists of the implicit 
rate. 
The discount rate on post-dated check and plain interest 
rate are almost the same for plain trade credit and tie-in 
credit. However, the implicit interest rate on trade credit 
greatly differs between the two sources of trade credit. The 
implicit interest charged by input suppliers is twice as high as 
the implicit interest rate charged by wholesalers/traders who are 
also input suppliers. What account for these results? 
Wholesalers/traders usually have marketing Contracts with 
big retailers or exporters. To assure themselves of a steady 
supply of footwear products, they engage in tie-in arrangements 
with footwear manufacturers. This is the best way they can 
reduce business risk arising from non-delivery of goods when 
they have no control on production. Since footwear manufacturers 
have alternative batlets for their products and have also 
alternative sources of inputs, wholesalers/traders are therefore 
compelled to give footwear manufacturers a better price for their 
products. The marketing contrapt also redubes the risk of 
default on the credit that wholesalers/traders extended to 
footwear manufacturers. 
The case is different with the input suppliers who are 
merely supplying inputs. Footwear manufacturers find the 
necessity of borrowing from the input suppliers since their 
working capital is tied up with the trade credits they extended 
to their customers. Therefore, input suppliers can exercise some 
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Table 30: COMPONENTS OF LENDING RATES OF MONEYLENDERS IN SAPANG PALAY 
Items A B C D E F G 
Weighted average 131.2 90.0 72.6 lending rate 1/ 59.2 108.8 126.8 135.4 
Less: Cost of Funds 2/ 45.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 _ _ _ 
Gross Spread 14.2 48.8 66.8 75.4 71.2 30.0 12.6 
Less: Transactions 
Costs 
1. Processing/ 0 0 0.7 Collection Costs 3/ 4.2 10.4 1.8 2.5 
2. Administrative 85.8 Costs 4/ 8.5 15.3 17.4 4.6 22.9 5.7 
3. Cost due to 9.8 17.3 delayed payments 5/ 0 0 0 9.2 0 
4. Cost of default 6/ 0 0 0 0 0 20.0 1.8 
Total 12.7 25.7 19.2 16.3 22.9 115.6 25.5 
Net Spread 1.5 23.1 47.6 59.1 48.3 -85.6 -12.9 
— — — — = = = = = = = = 
1/ 
The lending rate is weighted by the relative frequency of loans to 
maturity and is computed on the basis of nine months (i.e., January - September) 
V Refers to the actual cost of borrowed funds for moneylenders A and E. 
The rest refer to the opportunity cost of using own capital which is assumed 
to be the same as the cost of borrowed funds of moneylender E who is mobilizing 
deposits. All are computed on the basis of nine months. 
3/ Taken from Table IV.8. (Lamberte and Bunda 1988). 4 / ^ 
Salary of the moneylender based on the minimum wage of ,£54.50 per day. 
Part-time is equivalent to one-half day. 
5/ 
Interest rate due- to delayed payments. 6/ 
Refers to actual cost of loan default. 
Source: Lamberte & Bunda. "The Financial Markets in Low-Income 
Urban Conmunities: The Case of Sapang Palay." PIDS 
working Paper Series No. 88-05 CTable IV. 12). 
Table 31: COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE IN 
THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY 
Source/Component Percent per year Percent Share 
A. Plain Trade Credit 
(Input Suppliers) 
Discount rate on 
post-dated checks 33.18 28.51 
Plain interest rate 7.35 6.32 
Price differential 75.84 65.17 
Total 116.37 100.00 
B. Tie-in Credit (Whole-
salers/traders who are 
also input suppliers) 
Discount rate on 31.84 40.67 
post-dated check 
Plain interest rate 9.60 12.26 
Price differential 36.85 47.07 
T o t a l 78.29 100.00 
Source: Lamberte, M. B. and Jttse, Anita A. "The Manufacturing 
Sector and the informal Credit Markets: The Case of 
Trade Credits in the Footwear Industry." PIDS Working 
Paper Series No. 88-07; May 198i8. (Table IV-20) . 
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degree of pricing power which is reflected in greater overpricing 
of inputs. 
The total effective interest rates charged by input 
suppliers is 116.37 per annum; it is 78.29 percent per annum for 
the wholesalers/traders. In both cases the implicit interest 
rate accounts for the major portion of the total effective 
interest rate on trade credits. 
In determining the effective interest rate, results show 
that input suppliers discriminate between small and large firms. 
Loans to small firms carry higher rates than large firms. Large 
firms usually cater to big, well-established department stores 
whose post-dated checks are considered less risky than those 
issued by small retailers and, thus, command a lower discount 
rate. Large footwear manufacturers also exercise better 
bargaining power with their input suppliers compared with small 
ones, and therefore, they are able to get better terms. In other 
words, larger firms are charged lower implicit interest rate on 
their trade credits than the small firms. 
The lending rates among segments of the formal and informal 
sectors starting from 1981 when interest rates were liberalized 
up to 1986 is shown in Table 32. There is a wide variation in 
lending rates among these segments of the financial markets. 
Banks and CCUs appear to have the lowest lending rate. With the 
implicit interest rate added to the discount rate on post-dated 
checks, the effective interest rate on trade credit could have 
been the highest among the interest rates of the various segments 
of the urban ICMs examined for this study. 
Looking at trends in the various interest rates in the 
markets, it would seem that the interest rate liberalization 
failed to encourage more competition in the financial system. 
The real lending rates of the various segments of the financial 
markets established an increasing trend interrupted only in 1984 
and 1985 when inflation rates skyrocketed. This trend has been 
shown earlier to be true also for segments of the rural financial 
markets. It should however be noted that interest rate 
liberalization alone cannot encourage more competition. It 
should be accompanied with liberal bank entry. Unfortunately, 
bank entry and branching has remained overly restrictive at the 
time when interest rate was liberalized. In view of the 
oligopolistic market structure of the banking system in the 
country, the interest rate liberalization only gave banks an 
opportunity to raise the lending rates. Real bank spread has 
widened since interest rates were freed. Our results seem to 
suggest that tne increase in the lending rates in the formal 
sector have spilled over into the informal sector. 
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B. Competition Between Formal and Informal Sector 
In earlier section, we have elaborated on the degree of 
linkage between the formal and informal credit markets. We found 
that the two markets are largely complementary. They cater to 
what are essentially different segments of the financial markets. 
The various linkages that exist on the resource generation side 
and lending side among segments of the formal credit market and 
ICMs help reduce fragmentation in the financial system. Bankers 
observe that a great deal of trade credit to their clients ends 
up being lent informally. For instance, traders and industry 
integrators in the agriculture sector who borrow working capital 
loans from banks become, in effect/ retailers of bank funds in 
the informal credit markets (Agabin 1988). Findings of earlier 
studies on rural ICMs support this claim, in particular, a large 
number of trader-lenders in Geron (1988) are borrowers from 
banks. Such borrowings to augment capital are evidently tied to 
the lenders' trading businesses where lending is but a tool to 
assure supply. 
An area of competition between the formal and the informal 
markets seems to be present only to a limited degree in a segment 
of the loans market. This is the small loans market wherein 
pawnshops, money shops, lending investors and, to a certain 
extent, rural banks may have encroached into. For example, the 
money shop is an innovation that was introduced in 1973 with the 
agenda of reaching segments of the traditional, market of informal 
lenders in public market places. Money shops are the smallest 
unit or "scooping station" of banks for small deposits and loans. 
Under regulation by the Central Bank, money shops were allowed to 
collect higher service charge of 2.0 percent per month on small 
loans to market stallholders. Money shops mimic the practices of 
the informal lenders. Amortized daily on a straight basis and 
with interest collected up front, money shops could collect an 
effective rate of between 24.0-28.0 percent on clean loans during 
the time when the legal ceiling rate was only 14.0 percent per 
annum. The money shop concept was first experimented on by a big 
commercial bank, the Philippine Commercial International Bank 
(PCIB) to try to compete down the interest rate in the public 
market that was dominated by so called "5-6" lenders. At the 
time of their entry in the public market places, informal rates 
were reported in the level of 20.0 percent daily in 1973; these 
declined to 20.0 percent per month around the mid-1970s, and by 
the 1980s were around 5.0 to 10.0 percent per month. 
Experience over the years and internal banK policy shifts 
have made some money shops to be very selective. --For instance, a 
money shop operated by PCIB in urban Metro Manila since 1973 no 
longer grants loans below a certain loan size because of high 
administrative costs. Also, it is now paying more attention to 
loan securities whereas before loans were granted on clean basis. 
It has also ceased to lend to vendors of perishable.goods because 
of the smaller loan requirements and unsuitability of what they 
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sell for chattel mortgage. In other words, this money shop's 
selectivity tends to confine its lending to the "prime" clients 
in the public market place, and in this respect competition 
between the money shop and the informal sources seems to be 
limited only to the prime client segment of the small loans 
market. It is also, however, observed that those excluded in the 
selection process are serviced by the other informal lenders 
operating in the public market. These include around ten "5-6" 
lenders and a credit cooperative. What is interesting is that 
the credit cooperative of market vendors and stallholders has 
become the major competitor of informal lenders and corners 
around 60.0 percent of the credit market therein. The 
cooperative offers the lowest rates to members and a variety of 
product lines, and borrowing procedure is much simpler compared 
to that of the money shop. A moneylender interviewed for this 
study confirms this competition from the credit cooperative, 
stating that her lending volume in this public market has 
declined and has lead her to service a limited number of her 
"suki" (prime clients) which are mostly confined among the meat 
vendors. 
The same commercial bank lately opened a Shoe Industry Desk 
in its Marikina branch, where the biggest footwear industry is 
located. The target clientele of its special credit program are 
the footwear manufacturers, not the input suppliers. In fact, it 
tries to compete with input suppliers in discounting post-dated 
checks by offering a lower discount rate usually one (1) 
percentage point below the discount rate charged by input 
suppliers. However, the competition put up by PCIB is still 
limited to the so-called "prime" checks which are issued by big 
and well-known department stores in the country. This suggests 
that the formal sector competes with the informal sector only in 
the less risky financial instruments. With the large volume of 
post-dated checks floating around in the Marikina shoe industry, 
the participation of PCIB in the market for post-dated checks was 
hardly felt by the majority of the input suppliers interviewed 
for this study. 
Pawnshops and lending investors may have taken away some of 
the customers of the informal credit markets. Because of their 
rapid expansion they have provided small borrowers an alternative 
source of credit* A number of informal moneylenders, encouraged 
by the recent interest rate liberalization, have registered with 
the Central Bank as lending investors. As noted earlier, these 
institutions belong to the least regulated segment of the formal 
financial system. Hence, they enjoy greater flexibility in their 
operations. These institutions are close to the borderline of 
the ICMs in the financial system continuuft and, thus, have 
features almost similar to the ICM lenders. 
The issue bf competition between the formal sector and 
specif ic segments - of the informal credit markets in the rural 
should be a focus of mere detailed study in the future. 
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The data available to us at present do not allow us to derive 
meaningful analysis. 
C. ICMs as a Source of Innovations 
The terms and conditions of an informal loan can be 
variable. Maturity seems to cluster around four (4) to six (6) 
months. In the rural areas, loans tend to be incurred early 
during the planting seasons, both wet and dry, and repayments 
during harvest seasons. This arrangement fits well into the cash 
flow pattern of farming households, which is marked by 
seasonality. Other lenders employ a daily collection system as 
in the public market places. Salary deductions are the mode of 
collection of office-based credit unions. Many lenders do not 
require any collateral nor paper work. 
For a credit market to be sustainable in the long-run, the 
repayment rate should be reasonably high. Loan repayment partly 
hinges on the financial practices being used. That ICMs tend to 
create financial practices that suit well the cash flow pattern 
of borrowers is demonstrated in the low-income urban community 
of Sapang Palay. Here, a variety of "paluwagan" units exist from 
which a member can choose depending on how much money the 
individual wants to raise and on his cash flow pattern. Thus, 
one may join a "paluwagan" that requires small amount of 
contribution on a daily basis or one that demands a bigger amount 
of contribution. 
The repayment schemes of CCUs are also aligned with the cash 
flow pattern of their members. In the case of institution-based 
CCUs, loan repayments are scheduled on pay days. In addition, 
longer loan maturities ranging from five (5) to 48 months are 
granted to members because of their security of tenure in the 
institution where they are working. In contrast, market-based 
CCUs use a daily repayment scheme because of the high cash 
turnover of their members. Here, loan maturities are much 
shorter, not exceeding 200 days. 
Moneylenders in Sapang Palay offer various payment schemes 
to different borrowers to suit the latter\s needs and paying 
capacity. Three (3) general payment schemes are observed: one is 
called "steady" - no maturity date, only the interest on the 
principal is paid, with mostly businessmen as borrowers; the 
second is called "revolving" - loans have definite maturity dates 
and borrowers may select either daily, weekly or bi-monthly 
payment of principal and interest* A variant of this second 
scheme requires'no fixed amortization schedule but the principal 
and interest should be paid within the agreed maturity date. The 
third payment scheme is called "balikbayan" (returnees) 
borrowers may ask for a loan from the same moneylender any time 
they want which, in effect, provides borrowers with a credit line 
without a pre-established maximum credit line. This last scheme 
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is available only to borrowers with good track record with the 
lender. The loan principal and the interest are payable within 
one (1) day or one (1) week. 
In trade credits, the security instrument created is the 
post-dated check. This is considered the most highly negotiable 
instrument. In case the issuer of the post-dated check defaults, 
the footwear manufacturer who used it as a security for his trade 
credits is still liable to the input supplier who granted him the 
trade credits. 
Some of the practices of the ICMs have been tried by the 
formal financial system, such as by the lending investors, the 
non-stock savings and loans associations (NSSLAs), and the money 
shops. Lending investors are reported active in public markets 
and offices and employ collectors for daily or every pay day 
collection of repayments. NSSLAs are like CCUs and service only 
the loan requirements of their members. Some rural banks are 
experimenting with the daily collection scheme on loans to market 
vendors. The money shops and the discounting of post-dated 
checks found in the footwear industry of Marikina are adaptations 
by the formal system of some ICM practices. 
A short-lived experiment was also done by the government in 
the early 80s to channel funds to farmers through informal 
conduits, such as the grains traders and millers as well as input 
suppliers. The government then had a program called National 
Agricultural Productivity Program (NAPP) which included twelve 
commodity-specific program (see Esguerra 1987). Since most of 
the rural banks were financially distressed in the early 80s, the 
government decided to channel the funds through non-conventional 
conduits. There were three alternative financing schemes being 
developed, namely: (1) the National Food Authority (NFA) 
Assistance Scheme; (2) the Banking System Assistance Scheme; and 
(3) the End Users/Input Suppliers Assistance Scheme. These are 
all depicted in Figures 3 to 6. What is common to all these 
approaches is the linkage established between and among the 
credit source which insures input provision, the market for the 
output, and the farmer-borrower himself. The repayment rates of 
the various schemes ha£ been remarkable mostly in excess of 90 
percent. Despite its impressive repayment rate, the program had 
an undesirable result. That is, it was found that the additional 
loans obtained by the conduits merely substituted their own funds 
that would have gone anyway to. the ultimate borrowers. The 
entire program was terminated in 1986 since the newjy-instituted 
government consolidated ^11 .commodity-specific <agricultural 
c r e d l t programs into one fund. This was. part the move to do 
away with special credit programs?. The consolidated.fund is now 
used in beefing up the resources of the existing guarantee 
programs. 
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One innovative financial arrangement which is gaining 
popularity among federation of CCUs is the so-called 
"interlending scheme" or central liquidity fund CCUs operate 
much like a unit bank CCUs do not have funds transfer 
mechanism, they cannot rediscount with the Central Bank 
Although most of them are bank depositors, they do not generally 
enjoy a reciprocal arrangement from the bank on the borrowing 
side To cope with the problem of liquidity and boost investment 
opportunities, the interlending scheme was designed by 
cooperative federations Member CCUs contribute to the general 
fund managed by the federation and can borrow several times their 
contribution With this scheme, surplus CCUs would have a ready 
outlet for their excess funds, while deficit ones or those 
experiencing sudden increase in the demand for credit can 
immediately access external funds without resorting to credit 
rationing CCU federations which have this scheme find such 
activity highly profitable 
Instead of competing with the ICMs, some banks are Currently 
devising schemes to strengthen their linkage with th^ ICMs A 
"wholesale-retail" program is being considered in which banks 
provide wholesale credit to credit union federations which, in 
turn, retail them to their member CCUs The Land Bank of the 
Philippines is soon to begin implementation of such a scheme 
Similarly, a suitable loan guarantee scheme is being designed to 
encourage banks to lend to cooperatives on the strerigth of such 
guarantee 
Schemes to foster the linkage between the formal and 
informal sectors can exploit the potential comparative advantage 
inherent in the sectors Clearly, one particular segment of the 
ICMs where linkage arrangements seem suitable is w^thi the credit 
cooperative sector and other self-help savings and lending 
groups 
V AN OPTIMAL POLICY AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
It cannot be claimed that this research is the "study to encj 
all studies" about IC^ ls A number of otner important issues 
still need to be studied more closely The sector is also a very 
dynamic one, which would call for continuing research and 
monitoring The results of the study have cejrta^nAY increased 
our understanding of the workings of some segments -Of the lCMs. 
it is shown in this report that tfiere is g*ea£ ^versity in 
the ICMs in tferms of participants, instruments, interest t^tes, 
among others It is shown tHat the magnitude of4 th§ informal 
finance in the Philippines is sizeable The incidence, of 
informal borrowings is highest among the poor The ICtfs' also 
play a significant role in supplying the credit demand of small 
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and micro enterprises, market vendors, small farm producers, and 
overseas job seekers. A large portion of the loans obtained from 
the ICMs is used for productive investments. ICMs employ terms 
and conditions that suit the taste and preferences of borrowers. 
In particular, informal institutions have fashioned repayment 
schemes that fit well to the cash flow pattern of borrowers, 
helping ensure high repayment on loans. Contrary to common 
perception, informal institutions have successfully mobilized 
significant amount of deposits from non-wealthy individuals and 
households. All these suggest that the ICMs in the country 
cannot be ignored anymore, unfortunately, however, monitoring of 
the ICMs has been ignored in the accounting system of the 
Philippine financial system. A number of important conclusions 
deserve to be underscored at this point: 
Firsts, the ICMS serve as an important channel of financial 
services to individuals and enterprises which have very little or 
no access at all to the formal financial markets. Thus, ICMs help 
address the problem of allocation imbalances caused by the 
policies and procedures of banks. 
Second, there is a particularly high incidence of informal 
indebtedness among the small and poor borrowers. Hence, any 
policy intervention that would curb supply of credit in the 
informal markets would hurt rather than help the poor. 
Third, ICMs have helped vitalize the economy by mobilizing 
resources to meet the credit demands of a large part of the 
economy. To the extent that informal lenders have loans from the 
formal sources, theise lenders provide a network through which the 
financial resources of the formal system could be channeled to 
small borrowers. 
Fourth, financial markets in the country are severely 
fragmented and one cannot easily move from one market to the 
other. Hence, for the non-wealthy individuals who do not have 
access to bank credit* formal credit cannot be a substitute to 
the informal credit they get. Savings clubs and credit 
cooperatives are, however, effective substitutes for higher 
priced ICM sources. Their role in mobilizing small deposits is 
also potentially quite significant. It is important to stress 
that reciprocity counts a lot in the effectiveness of these 
institutions in mobilizing savings. 
Fifth, the existence of high rates of interest reflect a 
situation of excess demahd as well as imperfections not only in 
the credit markets but in the other markets as well. Interlinked 
market arrangements are rather common in. some segments and the 
exercise of certain degree of monopoly power by the lender is 
possible as evidenced in the input-supplier credit to footwear 
manufacturers. 
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Sixth, under economic normal situations, coto^lementarity 
rather than subs11tutabi11ty between the formal and informal 
credit sectors seems to be dominant The area competition 
appears narrow artd confined only to the better off Or "prime" 
clients both in the deposits and loan markets This implies 
that even with the exptthsion of banking services, banks would 
still be hard put to provide credit access to a relatively latge 
segment of the small borrowers/entrepreneurs and poor 
individuals and households 
Seventh, the positive reactions and rapid expansion 
exhibited by the lending investors and pawrishcfrs to the 
financial crisis and liberalization of interest rates shbuld be 
instructive for purposes of policymaking 
Eighth, the role of women in the ICMs is very prominent 
Women have a penchant for details, frankness, and innovations 
These are important Characteristics that one iitust have to 
effectively drive through the maize of ICMs The involvement of 
women in informal finance flows naturally from thelt major role 
in the household In the Philippines, the wives ^ake care of the 
financial matters of the household It is contaon tha t husbands 
surrender their cash income to their wives 
Ninth, ICMs are constantly innovating to suit the needs of 
clients Thus, clients have a wide array of credit arrangements 
to choose from innovations had the creation of a ctflture, and a 
culture has to invent concepts or terms to captofce > and express 
the meaning of a transaction The conce|*t has to be 
unequivocally understood by the transactors ttfus> rthe term "5-
6" was born since moneylenders were known to |4> and demand 
£6 for payment after a certain maturity date inferences in 
maturity can lead tb differences in effective lending rates The 
term "Balikbayan" was created to reflect the transaction wherein 
a borrower with good track record can borrow anytime he "wants 
from his moneylender 
The policy track then should be one that would increase 
rather than decrease the suppliers of credit Measures which re-
introduce anti-usury policies would be counter^ tnbbductive ah<3 
hence, should be avoided For example, two leg-Lislative bills 
before the Philippine Congress would do exactly jthis One bill 
proposes to place a ceiling on interest rates which pawnshops can 
collect on loans below a certain size Another p r e s s e s to put a 
cap on the lending spread of banks ' f 
Instead, a fruitful area for policy initiative is in the 
area of bank entry The restrictive bank entry^ -and branching 
policies should be relaxed in favor of encouraging more financial 
outlets Presently, the establishment of hew banks is not 
encouraged by the monetary authorities Those* W&p ftint to enter 
banking are asked to buy a bank under receiver^ro' oV one that 
has been closed down by the CB The existing Dtanfching policy 
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restricts opening up of new branches in areas considered 
"overbanked," and requires the purchase of government securities 
for every branch to be established. In the rural, areas, the 
present ban on opening new rural banks may be hurting the 
development of the rural financial markets. Such ban came about 
as a reaction to the financial problems encountered by the rural 
banking system on account of past policies, economic 
difficulties, and participation in the government lending 
programs. 
Liberal bank entry will facilitate conversion of CCUs ready 
to become a bank. Examples are NAMVESCO, the credit cooperatives 
of Baclaran, San Dionisio, and Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
(PLDT) employees. Similarly, some informal groups like 
"paluwagan" and savings and credit societies which have grown 
into cooperatives are in a position to have their own banks. By 
becoming banks, their services will not be limited to members 
only. These self-help groups have the expertise to handle small 
loans and deposits which other banks do not have. Moreover, 
depositors' security can be extended to these institutions by the 
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. Although no case of 
run on deposits has been experienced by CCUs even during the 
worst years of the financial crisis, the coverage of deposit 
insurance will enable the converted CCUs to attract larger 
deposits from members and non-members. 
Supporting linkages of self-help groups with banks through 
proper policy environment is another area to explore. This 
option is currently gaining support from a number of sectors. 
Effort in this area is being spearheaded by a number of non-
governmental organizations. Inthis regard, a re-orientation of 
the existing credit guarantee- facilities of the government in 
support of self-help groups would help in promoting such 
linkages. The government presently implements several guarantee 
programs j}/ which have been found to benefit mostly large 
borrowers and the banks accredited to participate in the schemes 
(Magno and Meyer 1988). 
Support to the sustained development of small savings club 
and cooperatives through training would make an impact on equity, 
allocation efficiency, and balancing of economic powers. There 
is wide scope for cooperatives and other self-help savings groups 
to engage in local resource/savings generation and lending. 
Along with this, the potential is also large for a cooperatives-
based promotion of investment opportunities; among the population 
with no access to banks and have limited resources to exploit 
V These are the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (GFSME), Quedan Guarantee Fund Board (QGFB) program, 
and the guarantee scheme under the Philippine Crop Insurance 
Corporation (PCIC). 
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investment and market opportunities. But a great deal of 
training inputs is necessary to equip them with Capabilities to 
plan, manage, implement savings, lending, arid investment 
activities as well as to keep simple accounting and auditing 
systems. 
With respect to trade credits, this is bound to grow rather 
than diminish in time. It should be recalled that discounting of 
checks is a popular mode used by informal creditors.- The issue 
is how to make the credit instrument, i.e., the checks issued to 
manufacturers, become a more widely bankable instrument 
especially for the benefit of the smaller manufacturers. There 
are pockets in the informal trade credit sector, like the 
footwear industry of Marikina, where bank initiative to discount 
issuer checks offers an alternative to the manufacturer. 
Nevertheless, discounting by this bank is still limited to checks 
issued by big and established department stores. 
Considering the importance of trade credit to small 
manufacturers and the rather large pricing differential against 
their favor, the government should encourage the setting up of an 
investigative agency to provide information on issuers of checks. 
This would be similar to the Credit Information Bureau, Inc. 
which the government helped establish a number of years ago to 
provide credit information on big borrowers to member banks. 
This investigative agency can be a private or ' a semi-private 
entity, possibly capitalized by manufacturers' associations 
and/or subscribers, including banks. The participation of 
manufacturers will be crucial especially in determining who to 
investigate among the issuers of checks. 
* 
The export of manpower is a significant source ' of foreign 
exchange for the country. Yet, as we have seen, the sector is 
largely fueled by ICMs. The priority policy option 'here is to 
make the job contract a negotiable instrument for bank loans and 
rediscounting with Central Bank. The scheme would be similar to 
exporters' credit wherein the eligible credit instruments are 
given priority by bank and in the rediscounting window of CB. 
One problem here, however, -is that banks try to avoid small loans 
because of high handling costs. One avenue to provide legitimate 
contract holders access to bank loans is by developing tie-ups 
between duly authorized recruitment agencies and banks. The 
agency can endorse and guarantee job contracts to the bank. The 
agency, in effect, will participate in the loan screening process 
which reduces the bank's transactions costs, and in the 
remittance of loan repayments. Moreover, seed funding and loan 
insurance/guarantee coverage on bank loans should be provided 
from the Welfare Fund, which has been set up with forced 
contributions from the workers. The above would be a better 
option than setting up a bank which is being considered by some 
quarters, to cater to overseas workers. 
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Pawnshops have a upotenUal f o r 1 iaing deposits. 
As o f t h e end r«fwlJMI3* pawnshops^tletJSf ihaye ;baen 
established throughout:; ^ e , coy^^y v ;Yetj tfce p^sipal, r -panpi^wer, 
and ptfeer repourfj© ^ pawnshops ,have no* been 
considered for servicing deposits in the ^arae way that are 
able to service relatively small loans. Being in the formal 
s^feor / depos its fl&Qbil ised by pawnshops eanenjoy the - ippotection 
of the deposit insur^nc^, systems. t>Qaaconstraint in setting? them 
to perform deposits g^naratfjon:coia^S fxoja the diffioulfcy of 
supervising so - many small unit®. The Central Bank has the 
supervisory power., over the pawnshops presently. in soroe 
countries like S*4;f^nka, small financial institutions in the 
rural areas wba lend pji Uie fefsis of pawns aria also allowed to 
accept deposits,,but th^y are ,linked an$ supervised by a sfcate-
o^na.4 commercial bank e , Th^ m<^t^ary authorities shp(tti<i seriously 
consider tapping this segment: ^pacially with 
only small amounts :> to deposit are likely to, bej benefited. 
Moreover, access to savings would be a source of additional 
loanable fund f^r th*pawnnbop*' rffS^tHacteijvdti*** now, 
many pawnshop operators depend, largely only on their own funds. 
Blending own funds with deposits may ^ result to liower interest 
rates on pawned loans. 
>astiy, a mon,it<w: fcngextern on j the : IGM& > sho<uld f be 
instituted. The most basic data needed it - for any ma rk<e t for an 
economic good or service, is the price offehe conroodity and the 
flow of transactions in ithe Qommoditys , the ease: gf the 
informal credit markers, it, isf-^ssential ^o have data on rate of 
interest. The initial concern <;is standardiaation. 
In view of the great heterogeneity among informal credit 
supplier s and reliability of jdata, a more viable oprfeion is to 
monitor the interest rates of the borderline institutions such as 
the pawnshops and lending investors. presently, ithe Central Bank 
does not monitor ,the interest rates charged by these 
institutions. Because of their large number of units, monitoring 
all of them inay not really fee feasible. Instead, a sample 
distributed according to geographic location and size of the 
institutions can be tracked thronjtgh time .1 
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